The choice to focus on moral perception, however, is not arbitrary. We saw in Chapter 1 (cf. §1.2) that one suggestive reason cited as grounds for encouraging the development of the moral imagination and related capacities of empathic response in the context of practical ethics education was because it is in a person’s initial emotional responses to a situation that his or her attention is drawn to its morally salient features and the moral problem itself, the object of moral deliberation if you will, is constructed on the basis of these first impressions. I begin by presenting in §5.2 what I consider to be a clear and plausible account of the basic role that moral perception plays in the construction of moral problems. In what I will refer to as the “Kantian situation of moral deliberation” we have, I will argue, such an account and, furthermore, one which has the important strategic advantage of being a hard case. An analysis of the role that emotions play in constructing moral problems, which is consistent with the basic Kantian prescriptive story of principle-based moral justification would seem to be better placed to please even the heartiest of ethical rationalists. After responding briefly, in §5.3, to the worry that the moral perception, occurring prior to moral deliberation, does not constitute a dimension of moral deliberation as such – and hence that a deficiency of moral perception would not entail a deficiency of moral judgement – I turn, in §5.4 to the nub of the matter: an examination of the postulate that the faculty of moral perception necessarily depends on active affective involvement. Here, I will argue that relevant and existing knowledge about the moral psychology of the diagnostic category of “psychopathy”, a personality disorder characterized by full cognitive integrity coexisting with emotional stagnancy, and corroborating empirical research on psychopathy and moral development, speak convincingly against the claim. As I argue in §5.5, while the evidence on moral functioning and psychopathy denies Callahan’s (1980), Coombs’ (1998), and Hilfiker’s (2001) hypothesis about the affectivity of moral perception, it corroborates their view that an affective disposition of concern for others underlies not just the ability to grasp the notion of normativity, the “bindingness” of valid moral rules, and the notion of moral obligation, but also plays an important role in what Callahan (1980) referred to as “the drive to get moral problems right”, or “moral conscience” under one interpretation of this term.
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An appreciation of this fact, commentators observe (cf., e.g., McLaughlin & Halstead, 1999 and Narváez & Lapsley, 2005), is one of the strengths of the character education approach to moral education which advocates the habituation and early moral socialization of children into pre-established and putatively uncontroversial patterns of moral responding.
For recent discussions of these issues see Hill (2000), Secker (1999), and Korsgaard (1999)
Habermas (1993b) and Korsgaard (1999) argue for similar interpretations.
See Baron et al.’s Three methods of ethics (1997) for authoritative accounts of each of these theories of normative ethics and the differences between them.
This distinction between monistic and pluralistic theories of moral judgement follows Hill (2000, pp. 11–12, 21–24).
Similar accounts of moral perception are to be found in Blum (1991), Vetlesen (1994), and Rest (1986). All respect that moral perception and moral judgement are analytically distinct components of moral functioning and all concur that the two components overlap at least insofar as they both involve moral appraisal.
Others in ethics who could seem to fall into the “believers” camp are Murdoch (1970), Blum (1980a, 1991) and Vetlesen (1996). For representatives of this position in the field of moral psychology see Rest (1986), Bebeau (1994, 2002), and Pizarro (2000).
Quoted in You and Bebeau (2005). For similarly agnostic views on the affectivity of moral perception see Hébert et al. (1990, 1992), and Akabayashi et al. (2004).
On the distinction between cognitivist and non-cognitivist conceptions of moral justification see, for example, Habermas (1993b) and Smith (1994).
Cf. also Spiecker (1988b). For a recent interpretation and defence of the controversial idea of a “moral emotion”, see de Sousa (2001).
More recently, a three-factor model has been developed in which Factor 1 is subdivided into a personality or emotional factor (e.g., “shallowness”) and a relational factor (e.g., “narcistic”) (Cooke & Michie, 2001). There is even a four-factor model that subdivides the behavioural component into lifestyle and antisocial behaviour factors (Neuman et al., 2005). Most research on psychopathy, however, adopts as its theoretical frame the two-factor model. I follow this convention.
Since the early 1980s, at least 20 psychological measures of moral sensitivity have been developed for the purpose of educational evaluation in fields as diverse as business, counselling, dentistry, journalism, medicine, and in pre-university schooling and the stronger measures, in You & Bebeau’s (2005) assessment are based on the early Dental Ethical Sensitivity Test (Bebeau et al., 1985).
These results are confounded by the fact that the experimental group did not, contrary to Blair’s (1995) expectations for the study, regard both moral norms and conventions as being equally un serious but rather claimed to regard violations of both as being very serious indeed. Parallel surprising results were collected with regards to the authority–contingency criterion. Apparently unsure exactly what to make of this, Blair posits that incarcerated psychopaths tend to give socially desirable answers. Yet, this raises immediately the question of why other incarcerated persons do not, and some non-incarcerated psychopaths do, respond identically (cf. Blair & Cipolotti, 2001).
Drawing on, for instance, Baron-Cohen’s (1989) work on people with autism’s deficient theory of mind, Blair’s (1996) claim about autistics’ ability to make the moral–convention distinction might seem highly implausible. But bracketing the possibility of methodological errors on Blair’s part, here one has little choice but to assert the Aristotelian principle that whatever exists is ipso facto possible.
I admit to almost total ignorance of the current state of research and policy on this question. Although Elliott and Gillett (1992) speak of a putative references to “a flaw in moral structure” (p. 54) as constituting a form of disease, it is not clear whether this is or may be used in legal proceedings as grounds for an insanity plea. It is entirely possible, of course, that current law in some or even many jurisdictions now recognizes an affective deficit as relevant to the assessment of criminal responsibility.
It should be noted that this account holds only for one category of psychopath, the so-called primary psychopath who, according to Cleckley (1950) are characterized by intelligence, charm, and social skill. Cleckley’s cases analyses identify also a category of “secondary” psychopath who are, in sharp contrast with primary psychopaths, characteristically socially inept and withdrawn (cf. also Elliott & Gillett, 1992, p. 55; Blackburn, 1988).
This position does not entail a commitment to one side or the other of the thorny internalist–externalist debate in ethics. Internalists and externalists do not disagree over the question of whether (basically normal or rational) moral agents have a motivating reason to act in accordance with their moral judgements. What they battle over instead is the question of precisely what kinds of reasons those reasons are and, in particular, whether the motivating reason in question is (1) logically entailed by the use of the use of terms such as “should” and “ought” a moral sense (i.e., the rough position of naturalism, descriptivism, and realism); or (2) a reflection of the agent’s prior values, moral beliefs, or mere preferences (i.e., the position of emotivism, prescriptivism, and projectivism). Cf. discussions of these issues in Smith (1994), Darwall et al. (1992), and Deigh (1995).
Peters (1981) and Hoffman (2000) both arrive at comparable conclusions though they argue for the point differently. In both cases, they can be seen as arguing that concern for others or “empathy”, in Hoffman’s term, as a presupposition of the process of “decentration” underlying moral development (cf. Gibbs, 1991) which, in the context of moral practice, requires that “children to take the other’s claims seriously and be willing to negotiate and compromise their own claims, rather than use the knowledge to manipulate each other” (p. 13; cf. Peters, 1981, pp. 172–173). Neither, however, distinguishes between a first-order concern for others’ well-being and the second-order interest of conscience in checking the reliability of one’s moral judgements.
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(2008). Compassionate Empathy, Moral Perception and Moral Conscience. In: Professional Ethics Education: Studies in Compassionate Empathy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6889-8_5
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