This chapter studies the problem of how and whether it is possible to reconcile these two conflicting but apparently equally convincing ideas about compassionate empathy’s moral status. It will be argued that the paradox dissolves in large measure when one recognizes the various and distinct ways in which it is possible to speak of an emotion as being “moral” or at least as being implicated in moral functioning: first, as a constitutive component of excellences or defaults of moral character; second, as a judgement-distorting passion; and third, as being generally conducive to moral consciousness and action (§4.2). What the distinction entails, obviously, is that, in view of being a member of the elite club of moral emotions in the first sense, compassionate empathy has a genuine claim to categorical moral value—and, indeed, a fortiori I will argue (in §4.3) that compassionate empathy has a special morally elevated status in that class itself. However, like all emotions, compassionate empathy is liable to become passionate. In this connection, and as demonstrated by a brief review of empirical evidence and related theoretical considerations to the effect that compassionate empathy has an apparently constitutional susceptibility to bias (in §4.4.1), empathy’s incompatibility with the ideal of the impartiality of moral judgement is little short of striking. After briefly setting out the meaning of impartiality as a criterion of moral evaluation and arguing that standard objections levied against impartiality as a genuine criterion of a moral evaluation seem to miss the mark (§4.4.2), I conclude that, irrespective of the fact that compassionate empathy is strongly antithetical to one crucial dimension of a moral outlook—impartiality—its attractiveness as a focal point of moral-developmental interest and educational intervention is both explained and justified by the fact that it expresses just as strongly another—the idea of normativity or, loosely, that human needs carry with them binding practical demands on one’s attentions and actions.
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Even if one disagrees with these particular normative expectations, the main point is that such normative standards are probably a universal moral phenomenon even thought the specific content of such expectations will naturally vary to some degree from cultural community to cultural community.
The popular notion of pulling oneself together emotionally is usually discussed in the philosophical literature on the emotions and emotional regulation as “bootstrapping” (e.g., Kristjánsson, 2005). An occasion to present a more detailed picture of the several strategies which may assist in efforts to bootstrap will arise when the discussion returns to examine various conceptions of educating moral emotions in Chapter 6.
Full rationality is understood here rather formally in William’s (1981) broad sense of being based on no false beliefs, having only relevant true beliefs, and correct deliberation (cf. also Smith, 1994).
An exception might be Nietzsche and kindred spirits who seem to regard the moral emotions as a form of human frailty (cf. Nietzsche, 1954, 1999).
For an in-depth discussion of the role of perceived desert in emotions involved in the appraisal of others’ conditions of well-being, see Kristjánsson (2003).
The relationship between the observer and the sufferer is often a relevant factor in determining the appropriateness of response. For instance, the kind of distress that it is appropriate for me to have when my child becomes gravely ill is not the same if my neighbour’s child becomes ill. However, relationships are one factor to be balanced with the other factors. For example, if my child is in bed with a low fever but the neighbour’s child has been hospitalized with a suspected case of avian influenza it would be absurd for me not to be more intensely concerned for my neighbour’s child than for my own. See also the discussion of special obligations and impartiality later in §4.4.2. The general point, of course, is that how much and towards whom one compassionate empathic involvement is appropriate is a delicate question of the application of practical judgement in a set of particular circumstances and thus can only be decided on a case-by-case basis.
In a session of an educational conference I once attended, a pair of delegates argued passionately but unpersuasively, to my mind, that fostering a sense of compassion towards the natural environment was an essential ingredient in any defensible programme of environmental education. Nature is the proper object of many fine and noble emotions—awe, respect, care, love, gratitude, and others—and one can certainly feel compassion towards animals and other sentient forms of life. It seems to me clearly idiosyncratic, however, to claim that one should feel compassion towards the environment for the simple reason that the environment cannot feel or suffer (except of course in a derivative metaphorical sense).
For characterizations and defences of the moral domain in these terms, varying in their degrees of depth and strategic approaches, see Frankena (1973), Peters (1981), Turiel (1983), Nunner-Winkler (1994), Warnock (1996), and Nucci (2001).
For discussions of Godwin’s dilemma and parallel critiques to the effect that theories of normative ethics frequently prescribe unacceptably high standards of judgement and action see Toumlin (1981), Cottingham (1983), MacIntyre (1983), Baron (1991), Blustein (1991), Flanagan (1996), and Ashcroft (2001).
Cf. Sidgwick’s classical formulation of this argument in 1907/1981 (pp. 434ff). For an overview of the range of positions currently defended in contemporary ethics vis-à-vis special obligations, see Jeske (2002).
For examples of this critical position, see Trainer (1977), Fraenkel (1978), and Peters (1981).
See Carr (2001) and Wringe (2006) for persuasive and, in the latter case, elaborate and protracted arguments to the effect that, indeed, skill in moral reasoning in large part consists itself in the judicious assessment of when and to what extent different and possibly incommensurable justificatory criteria are relevant to a particular moral problem.
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(2008). The Paradox of Compassionate Empathy's Moral Worth. In: Professional Ethics Education: Studies in Compassionate Empathy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6889-8_4
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