Taken in one sense, the question of whether encouraging compassionate empathic responding is a legitimate aim of a higher education in ethics is at best trivial and at worst inane. For better or for worse, there is a long if now routed tradition, strongest in the United States but apparent in the structure of British universities as well, that the final stage of the long process of personal, social, and moral development stretching from the earliest years of childhood and into the primary and secondary school years was college, understood as an opportunity for the refinement of one’s moral character through sophisticated cultural initiation and personal development. In this connection, it is not insignificant to observe that during most of the nineteenth century the keystone of the college curriculum in United States was moral philosophy. The course was required of all students and usually taught by the college president himself.1 One can reasonably assume that, before this flower of renaissance humanism began to fade, not to provide a college environment supportive of compassionate empathy, along side other such character traits as honesty, courage, fairmindedness, and integrity, would be inconsistent with the college system’s own raison d’être and constitute, therefore, an educational failure through neglect. From this perspective, even to entertain the question of whether it might or might not be a good thing for young people to be initiated into sympathy and compassion, in practical ethics education as elsewhere in higher education, might be accused of being, in Williams’ (1981) evocative phrase, one thought too many.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
For discussions on higher education’s former vocation as a site for the perfection of moral character, see Sloan (1980), Annis (1992), McNeel (1994), Gutek (1995), and Sandin (1989).
A sampling of major philosophical analyses of emotion would include Gordon (1987), de Sousa (1987), Ben Ze’ev (2000), Solomon (1984), and Nussbaum (2001). For works focusing more specifically on emotions and ethics, see Stocker (1996) Tappolet (2000), Oakley (1992), and Gibbard (1990).
For a brief general discussion of “personal distress” as distinct from “empathy”, see Eisenberg and Strayer (1987, pp. 7–8).
For instance, the smug satisfaction or comfort people sometimes take in the misfortune of others, an emotion on which the tabloid press capitalizes lavishly, is a form of happiness one might judge worthy of removal. Similarly, the exercise of the so-called virtues of will power, self-control, and deliberation, characteristically involve choosing self-denial, a form of suffering, with an eye to achieving some future goal (cf. Steutel, 1999).
For a review of other similar studies, see Hoffman (1978).
For a contrary view, see Ben Ze’ev (2000).
Gordon does not make explicit reference to compassion but his albeit brief account of the role of vicarious identification in ethical judgement suggests that he has in mind an analogous emotion.
Crude because, for one thing, it does not allow room for moral obligations to oneself. Cf. Kant (1797/1996, pp. 17–175), Metaphysics of morals.
I would hazard to advance that the perspective-taking/compassion folk belief is endemic to philosophical discussion from at least the time of Adam Smith to the present. This suggestion, that one would be hard-pressed to find a published philosophical discussion of compassion that neither presupposes nor argues explicitly that perspective-taking is indispensable to the experience of compassion, is admittedly a presumptuous claim and I do not pretend to have done it anything like justice. However, for further partial confirmation, which the reader may pursue at his or her leisure and inclination, see discussions of compassion and analogues and the role centrality of imaginative dwelling therein in Nussbaum (2001), Scheler (1954), and Mercer (1972).
One particularly memorable experiment, performed apparently by Strack et al. in 1988, involved taping golf tees to either side of a group of hapless undergraduates’ foreheads and, in an effort to have them hold their faces in an unwitting frown, instructing them instructed to “move the tees together”. Their emotional responses to photographs of starving children and other sad scenes were then measured and the test group, those with the golf tees taped to their foreheads, were judged by the investigators to have perceived the scenes as sadder than the control group (cf. Hoffman, 2000, p. 41).
If the totally unscientific observation of one’s own children is anything to go on, whenever the author’s own 21-month-old baby hears another baby crying, she screws up her face in a look of mock anguish, taps her head, and repeats, “Head! Head!” suggesting that the reason why the baby is crying is because he is in pain from having bumped his head—although admittedly whether this is in and of itself constitutes evidence of entertaining a belief about other babies’ inner states rather than the expression of a causal belief about what makes babies cry is an open question.
For parallel assessments, see Verducci (1999) and Blasi (1999).
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2008 Springer Science + Business Media B.V
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
(2008). A Conceptual and Empirical Sketch of Compassionate Empathy. In: Professional Ethics Education: Studies in Compassionate Empathy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6889-8_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6889-8_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-6888-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-6889-8
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)