Rational Choice and Evolutionary Fit

abstract

Despite their irrationality, moral agents are more likely to pass on their genes than non-moral agents. This news is spearheading a shift from classical rational choice models to a resurgence of evolutionary ethics. Ignoring its unfavorable association with Social Darwinism, evolutionary ethics is not without its critics. As Maynard Smith observes, ‘A scientific theory – Darwinism or any other – has nothing to say about the value of a human being.’ My role in this paper is to say otherwise. Specifically, I argue against the following charges: (i) Evolutionary models show the success of the wrong thing: heritability, not preferences. For agents who have no specific interest in the benefits of their future progeny, morality will not be motivating. (ii) Computer simulations show ‘success’ under very limiting initial conditions. The probability of those initial conditions is exceedingly low. (iii) The ‘winner’ in artificial games does not sufficiently capture moral agency. (iv) Evolutionary ethics commits the is-ought problem. Morality is a normative notion, whereas evolutionary accounts can only speak in terms of description.