The Lower Forms of Objectification
The question of background also interests us here with respect to the kind of consciousness of the experiential moments of perception itself. One hard question is to decide in which way the sensations are conscious in perception and in which way, on the other hand, the character of the apprehending of the perception is.
Perception is, psychologically speaking, the experience we have when, for example, we see a tree, “for, before our eyes stands the tree” with definitely appearing sides. We do not see the sensations. Our perceiving attention, believing, our apperceptive objectifying are not directed towards them. And yet they are “conscious”. What does “conscious” mean here, if not perceived?
They do not belong to the objective background, for that is a thing background. The house has its spatial environment. It stands amid such and such things. The sensations are not things in the background. It is evident, however, that from the simple turning toward the house, a different turning, a “reflection” upon the perception and its content, is possible. It is evident that this possibility belongs to the essence of the perception. But, reflection is, nevertheless, perception that is related to the perception and to its content. We know how this content is given in reflective perception. It is given there as perceived. How, though, is the content of the perception, for example, its sensation content, given before the reflection, how is it “on hand” in it?
KeywordsManifold Amid Posit Bors Dial
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- 1.The part of the lecture about the lower forms of objectifying could not be located in entirety in the Nachlass, see Hua XXIV, p. XLIf. and “Textkritischen Anmerkungen”, p. 490 (Editor’s note).Google Scholar
- 2.And, by what right do we in general come to accept naive, and not merely seen, perceptions for that?.Google Scholar
- 3.Narrower concept of intentional consciousness, knowing, knownness. Narrowest concept: perception, just perhaps “inner” consciousness equaling becoming aware.Google Scholar
- 4.Naturally, the “first (and then)” not to be taken in the contingent sense, but in the sense of Aristotle’s πρóτερον.Google Scholar
- 5.Act characters, if we merely <take> the moment of the position-taking—act inc<lusive position-taking>.Google Scholar
- 6.Appearance and attentiveness reigning within it can come under consideration.Google Scholar
- 7.Must not at least a “modification” be given? Of course, not always an actual positiontaking. But, at least an “imagination”.Google Scholar
- 8.The parallel is a false one, because the statement is a misunderstanding for illusions. Illusions are really modified consciousness.Google Scholar
- 9.Very precarious, compare a page in “Impression und Idee”. Have I apprehended past-phases of the sensation as past? I have a “reverberation”. Let us think, which is easier, of a succession of sounds flowing off. Then, with C, I have A and B “still in consciousness”. Have I apprehended a content A´ there as A past? And, can one speak of a past-phase of the sensation equaling A´ ? A´ is a modification analogous to illusion (A) and is itself past consciousness of A. [The page referred to could not be found. Comp. Husserliana XXIV, p. 496. Translator’s note.].Google Scholar
- 10.That is fine, but the last statement is incorrect as it stands. If, to begin with, we restrict ourselves to immanent contents, therefore, for example, immanent sounds or sequences of sounds, then a sound, say, “now”, is presently given, the others not, but given in the form of immanent, indirect weres. In “trailings off ”, if you will. But, these trailings off, if they are not themselves to be the past sounds, are already “presentations” of weres and there are not first “modified contents” of any kind (as “trailings off ”) there that first mean past sounds by means of apprehending, namely modified apprehending. Just as an illusion is in itself already a presentationsimulation- of. It is a different matter if we consider transient objects and processes. Then, we have immanent processes that undergo transient apprehending, and then the statement is correct, if by sensations we understand the contents and by trailing off of the sensation, the past phases of the contents of the sensation of duration.Google Scholar
- 11.Fundamentally wrong. It is not the sensation contents that remain. Otherwise, they would be sensation contents and now. Sensation is not a content and consciousness of givenness in addition, and (immanent) memory content is not content again and then consciousness of the past as a new consciousness of givenness.Google Scholar
- 12.If we are talking about transient perceptions here, then it needs to be said that a transient appearance dwells in them as an immanent content. Now, the same thing holds of this appearance as holds of any immanent content, for example, of “sound”. Corresponding to the perception’s now-point is a constituting, impressional, appearance phansis, and following upon that, a steady series of modifications, a “sinking”, namely corresponding to the steady occurring of a new now. These modifications are all modifications of the same content, the one sensed in the actual appearance impression at the beginning. Therefore, “the same thing”, the same appearance phansis, namely, impressional, incessantly shows itself, and in this sense one can say “the same appearance everywhere”. If we do not have any transient perceptions (or appearances), then it is to be kept in mind that the modifications are already in themselves modifications-of (thus, intentionalities of the lowest level) and surely also the impressional moment of each now. No special perceptions are needed adding on to any dead material of “sensations” and “illusions”, which would be mere “contents”, etc. Everything is “consciousness”, but consciousness is not something adding on (only insofar as higher consciousness is based on consciousness do lower intentional unities form the groundwork for higher ones). If we call the impressional moment “sound” belonging to the now-point of the immanent object (the object-sound-now) sensation, then this impressional moment is already consciousness, sound consciousness. Naturally, if the steady continuity of the impressional moments is not identical to the duration of the sound, since this <is> precisely an objective unity, then sensation is sensation-of, and this does not suffice either to bring the unity of the now and the duration of the sound to givenness. Were an I conceivable in which this sequence of sensations elapsed, then there would not be any sound there. Sound is there and adequately there, itself there, only when this sequence of sensations is interfused with the manifold of the sequence of modifications in the ways indicated. Naturally, if the sensation is also self-positioning of the sound, then the sound could not be given as self-identical, as a unity, without retention, which consequently is essentially part of the sound as unity. However, the constituting consciousness does not appear to be such a unity, but this still requires investigation.Google Scholar
- 13.That does not, though, mean that it itself remains unchanged and just receives some new “form”. The overlapping is intentional overlapping as concerns the “content” of what was referred to.Google Scholar
- 14.The apprehending concretely understood: the appearance is itself an immanent unity and corresponding to this are the apprehending impressions and modifications.Google Scholar
- 15.This word was in English in the original (Translator’s note).Google Scholar