Law and Power

La Torre, Massimo

doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6607-8_5

Massimo La Torre^2,3

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 90))

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Abstract

The fifth chapter resumes the discussion of the relationship between law and power, while power is now conceptualized through the notion of institution. Attention is now devoted to sociology of law and sociological doctrines. Kelsen’s solution thus appears more promising, once however power is no longer related to facticity or coercion or sanction, but rather to institutional facts and institutions.

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Notes

1.
“The general theories of law and State may be distinguished into two broad categories according to whether they assert the primacy of power over norm, or conversely, of norm over power” (N. Bobbio, Kelsen e il potere giuridico, in Ricerche politiche, ed. by M. Bovero, Milano 1982, p. 3).
2.
L. Gumplowicz, Was ist Recht? in Id., Ausgewählte Werke, vol. 4, ed. by G. Salomon, Innsbruck 1928, pp. 2–3.
3.
Ibid., p. 3.
4.
This same conception was taken up many years later by Vincenzo Tomeo, a distinguished Italian sociologist, fascinated by a view that seems not to attribute to the law the virtues (or defects) of an agent in settling social conflicts. Thus, Tomeo affirms that “the law represents and delineates the structural schema for conflict between interests and between groups” (V. Tomeo, Il diritto come struttura del conflitto. Una analisi sociologica, Milano 1981, p. 85). Outlining this position, Tomeo refers explicitly to Gumplowicz: see V. Tomeo, Il diritto come segno del potere, in Sociologia del diritto, 1980, pp. 37–39. “The law, in short, is the instrument that records and verifies the reciprocal power position of groups” (ibid., p. 38); this is the central idea Tomeo thinks he can attribute to the sociology of the Austro-Polish author.
5.
M. Foucault, Difendere la società. Dalla guerra delle razze al razzismo di Stato, in the version ed. and trans. by M. Bertami and A. Fontana, Florence 1990, pp. 44–45. For the view that it is violence that is at the root of law, see also T. Mann, Das Gesetz, in Id., Die Erzählungen, Frankfurt am Main 1986, pp. 1010–1011.
6.
M. Foucault, Op. cit., p. 48.
7.
Ibid., p. 32.
8.
Ibid., p. 45.
9.
Ibid., p. 50.
10.
Ibid., p. 38.
11.
As the Italian editors note, Foucault’s positions “are […] the harsh, disquieting ones of Thrasymachus” (Op. cit., p. 15). And it is the “Thrasymachus argument” that is at the origin of the “realist” attitude in politics (cf. A. Passerin d’Entrèves, La dottrina dello Stato, pp. 23ff).
12.
M. Foucault, Op. cit., p. 27.
13.
Ibid., p. 28.
14.
Ibid.
15.
Ibid., p. 31.
16.
As Habermas notes, Foucault radicalizes Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of instrumental reason into a theory of the “eternal return” of power (see J. Habermas, Die Krise des Wohlfahrtsstaates und die Erschöpfung utopischer Energien, in Id., Die Moderne – ein unvollendetes Projekt. Philosophisch-politische Aufsätze 1977–1992, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1992, p. 109).
17.
M. Foucault, Op. cit., p. 32.
18.
Ibid., pp. 34–35.
19.
See e.g., M. Foucault, L’ordre du discours, Paris 1971, p. 15.
20.
L. Gumplowicz, Op. cit., p. 11.
21.
See T. Geiger, Ideologie und Wahrheit. Eine soziologische Kritik des Denkens, 2nd ed., Neuweid am Rhein 1968.
22.
T. Geiger, Vorstudien zu einer Soziologie des Rechts, 2nd ed., Neuwied am Rhein 1964, p. 161.
23.
Ibid., p. 339
24.
See M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie, 5th ed., ed. by J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1985, p. 28.
25.
T. Geiger, Op. cit., p. 340. It is interesting to note that Ralf Dreier, in distinguishing the various positive-law theories into those (a) “oriented to the efficacy” and (b) “oriented to the production” of law, and those “oriented to efficacy” into (i) “according to the external aspect” and (ii) “according to the internal aspect” of norms, locates both Geiger’s and Weber’s conceptions among the positive-law theories “oriented to efficacy” “according to the external aspect of norms”. See R. Dreier, Der Begriff des Rechts, in Id., Recht-Staat-Vernunft. Studien zur Rechtstheorie 2, Frankfurt am Main 1991, pp. 96–97; and cf. R. Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, Freiburg 1992, pp. 31ff.
26.
T. Geiger, Op. cit., p. 342.
27.
See e.g., J. Habermas, Hannah Arendts Begriff der Macht, in Id., Politik, Kunst, Religion. Essays über zeitgenössische Philosophen, Stuttgart 1982, pp. 103ff.
28.
See T. Geiger, Op. cit., p. 342.
29.
Ibid., p. 345.
30.
See G. Gurvitch, Sociology of Law, London 1953, pp. 160ff.
31.
Ibid.
32.
Ibid., p. 162.
33.
Ibid., p. 167.
34.
Ibid.
35.
Ibid., p. 168.
36.
Ibid., p. 198.
37.
See M. Hauriou, La théorie de l’institution et de la fondation. Essai de vitalisme social, in Id., Aux sources du droit. Le pouvoir, l’ordre et la liberté, Paris 1933, p. 91.
38.
See M. Hauriou, L’ordre social, la justice et le droit, in Id., Aux sources du droit. Le pouvoir, l’ordre et la liberté, pp. 84ff.
39.
M. Hauriou, La théorie de l’institution et de la fondation, p. 94.
40.
Ibid., p. 127.
41.
Ibid., p. 128.
42.
Ibid., p. 94.
43.
Ibid., p. 96.
44.
See ibid., p. 98. Cf. also ibid., p. 116.
45.
On “Platonism” in connection with Hauriou’s theory see A. Baratta, Presentazione, in M. Hauriou, Teoria dell’istituzione e della fondazione, ed. by W. Cesarini Sforza, Milano 1967, p. xii.
46.
M. Hauriou, La théorie de l’institution et de la fondation, p. 101.
47.
Ibid., p. 102.
48.
Ibid., p. 114.
49.
See ibid., p. 104.
50.
S. Romano, Principii di diritto costituzionale generale, 2nd ed., Milano 1946, p. 56, emphasis in original. Cf. ibid., p. 59.
51.
Cf. Massimo La Torre, The End of the 19th Century: The Messina Earthquake and the State of Exception, in Ratio Juris, 2011 (forthcoming).
52.
S. Romano, Principii di diritto costituzionale generale, p. 57.
53.
See ibid.
54.
On this, see E. Pattaro, Il realismo giuridico scandinavo. I. Axel Hägerström, Bologna 1975, pp. 93ff.
55.
See Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th ed., ed. by P. J. Fitzgerald, London 1966, pp. 84ff.
56.
A. Hägerström, Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals, ed. by K. Olivecrona, English trans. by C. D. Broad, Stockholm 1953, p. 33.
57.
S. Romano, Frammenti di un dizionario giuridico, 2nd ed., Milan 1983, p. 224.
58.
Cf. above Chapter 1, p.
59.
K. Olivecrona, Is a Sociological Explanation of Law Possible? in Theoria, 1948, p. 206.
60.
Ibid., p. 207.
61.
C. Schmitt, Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens, Hamburg 1934, p. 15
62.
Ibid., p. 13.
63.
See ibid., p. 51.
64.
On this, cf. B. Rüthers, Entartetes Recht. Rechtslehren und Kronjuristen im Dritten Reich, Munich 1988.
65.
O. Weinberger, Droit et connaissance du droit au regard du positivisme juridique institutionnaliste, in Droits, vol. 10, 1989, p. 111.
66.
O. Weinberger, Institutionentheorie und Institutionalistischer Rechtspositivismus, in Id., Recht, Institution und Rechtspolitik. Grundprobleme der Rechtstheorie und Sozialphilosophie, Stuttgart 1987, pp. 176–177.
67.
Ibid., p. 177. My emphasis.
68.
N. MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, in The Modern Law Review, 1993, p. 11.
69.
See ibid., pp. 13–14. See also N. MacCormick, Der Rechtsstaat und die ‘Rule of Law’, in Juristenzeitung, 1984, pp. 65–70; and H. Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff. Kritische Untersuchungen des Verhältnisses von Staat und Recht, 2nd ed., Tübingen 1928, p. 191. And cf. G. Zagrebelsky, Il diritto mite. Legge, diritti, giustizia, Torino 1992, p. 22.
70.
S. Romano, Principii di diritto costituzionale generale, p. 83. Emphasis in original.
71.
O. Weinberger, Verfassungstheorie vom Standpunkt des neuen Institutionalismus, p. 105.
72.
Ibid.
73.
Ibid.
74.
M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5th ed., ed. by, J. Winckelmann, Mohr, Tübingen 1985, p. 28.
75.
O. Weinberger, Verfassungstheorie vom Standpunkt des neuen Institutionalismus, p. 111.
76.
See G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3rd ed., Darmstadt 1960, p. 340.
77.
O. Weinberger, Verfassungstheorie vom Standpunkt des neuen Institutionalismus, p. 111
78.
Ibid., p. 12
79.
“‘Herrschaft des Rechts’ ist keine Beschreibung der Machtverhältnisse in der Gesellschaft, sondern eine ideelle Konstruktion” (ibid., p. 110).
80.
“Auch der absolute Alleinherrscher ist ermächtigtes Organ des Staates, er hat eine gesellschaftliche Rolle in der Institution. Falls ‘princeps legibus solutus’ gilt, gilt dieser Grundsatz als Element des Rechtssystems” (ibid.).
81.
L. Wittgenstein, Zettel, English trans. by G. E. Anscombe, Oxford 1967, § 293, p. 53. See also L. Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie, Frankfurt am Main 1984, p. 87.
82.
H. Schwyzer, Rules and Practices, in Philosophical Review, 1969, p. 464. Emphasis in original.
83.
See for example L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, pp. 237–238.
84.
Cf. O. Weinberger, Verfassungstheorie vom Standpunkt des neuen Institutionalismus, p. 103 For Weinberger, it is the “guiding idea” that supplies the “conceptual determination of the institution’s tasks” and hence the criterion for distinguishing among the various institutions.
85.
H. Schwyzer, Rules and Practices, p. 467.
86.
“Leitideen etablieren sich zusammen mit den entsprechenden Institutionen” (O. Weinberger, Verfassungstheorie vom Standpunkt des neuen Institutionalismus, p. 108).
87.
See V. Pareto, Compendio di sociologia generale, Torino 1978, Chapter 6. On this cf. D. Farias, La demistificazione delle ideologie e Vilfredo Pareto, in Id., Saggi di filosofia politica, Milano 1977, pp. 361ff.
88.
A. Caffi, Critica della violenza, Milano 1966, p. 323.
89.
M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5th ed., p. 28. However, it is hard to regard Weber as a “realist” (in the sense indicated above), on the one hand because of his conception of social action in general (which turns around the concept of Sinn or “meaning”), and then because he, in speaking of power, of Herrschaft (which might also be translated as rule) hastens to add that in every authentic power relationship there inheres a minimum of will to obey, that is, an interest (internal or external) in obedience (see ibid., p. 122), and introduces the concept of “legitimacy” of power.
90.
J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government, in Id., A Fragment on Government and an Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. by W. Harrison, Oxford 1960, p. 38.
91.
For this thesis, the necessary reference is to the thought of Hayek. See e.g., F. A. Hayek, Die Irrtümer des Konstruktivismus und die Grundlagen legitimer Kritik gesellschaftlicher Gebilde, Tübingen 1975, pp. 5ff.
92.
P. Levi, I sommersi e i salvati, Torino 1986, p. 30.
93.
“Alle Gewalt ist als Mittel entweder rechtsetzend oder rechtserhaltend” (W. Benjamin, Zur Kritik der Gewalt, now in Id., Zur Kritik der Gewalt und andere Aufsätze, with a postword by H. Marcuse, Frankfurt am Main 1990, p. 45). Cf. E Resta, L’ambiguo diritto, Milan 1984, p. 14: “What Benjamin says […] raises a central problem in analysing legal systems: the weight of force, or if you will the structural ambiguity of Gewalt in the ‘rationality’ of modern politics. The alternative Benjamin sets out between theology and mysticism identifies the central node of the ambiguity of the political, that is, the irrepressibly theological nature of power and of the law on which it is based. This means that all auctoritas on which political systems are based is founded exclusively on force, both when legal power is created, and when it is conserved” (emphasis in original).
94.
Cf. S. Cotta, Dalla guerra alla pace. Un itinerario filosofico, Milano 1989.
95.
On the non-realism of “political realism” see the fine work by N. Chiaromonte, “Il realista e l’utopista”, in Id., Scritti politici e civili, Milano 1976, pp. 277ff.
96.
T. Parsons, Evolutionary Universals in Society, in Id., On Institutions and Social Evolution. Selected Writings, ed. by L. H. Mayhew, Chicago 1985, p. 309. Emphasis in original.
97.
See e.g., K. Olivecrona, Ideologie und Realität des Geldes, Lund 1948.
98.
T. Parsons, Op. cit., pp. 309–310. We are very far here from the approach that power is eminently restrictive, the power to stop something being done. On Parson’s reconstruction, political power is exactly the opposite: the power to get done, the power to mobilize a group’s social forces.
99.
On the modern State as abstract entity cf. R. De Stefano, Il problema del potere, Milano 1962, pp. 135–137.
100.
J. Gil, Un’antropologia delle forze. Dalle società senza Stato alle società statuali, Torin 1983, p. vii.
101.
But see S. Romano, Principii di diritto costituzionale generale, p. 54: “Despite any expression that might lead one to believe the contrary, the State has never been fully identified with its government. Even when Louis XIV was able to say ‘L’Etat c’est moi’, or in such official documents as international treaties the State was designated by the name of its monarch, or where in laws the words State and Crown were used indifferently as synonyms, all that was meant to be indicated was the State, through the person or entity that was its head, and could accordingly represent it more concretely, that is, the whole was being indicated by the part”.
102.
See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford 1961, pp. 89–90.
103.
T. Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. by R. Tuck and M. Silverthorne, Cambridge 1997, p. 73. Emphasis in original.
104.
Cf. R. De Stefano, Il rifiuto della legge, Reggio Calabria 1977, pp. 21–22.
105.
For a polished example of this position cf. F. Crespi, Azione sociale e potere, Bologna 1989, pp. 78ff.
106.
Cf. N. Garver, Rules, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by P. Edwards, vol. 7, New York, NY 1967, p. 232
107.
I will tackle this issue in Chapter 8.
108.
Cf. P. Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford, 1997, Chapter 7.
109.
Following this I distance myself from Philip Petit’s views presented in his book cited above.

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Università degli Studi “Magna Graecia” di Catanzaro, 88100, Catanzaro, Italy
Prof. Massimo La Torre
The University of Hull, Hull, HU6 7RX, UK
Prof. Massimo La Torre

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La Torre, M. (2010). Law and Power. In: Law as Institution. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 90. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6607-8_5

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6607-8_5
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