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On Conditionals

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Handbook of Philosophical Logic

Part of the book series: Handbook of Philosophical Logic ((HALO,volume 14))

The ability to think conditional thoughts is a basic part of our mental equipment. A view of the world would be an idle, ineffectual affair without them. There’s not much point in recognising that there’s a predator in your path unless you also realise that if you don’t change direction pretty quickly you will be eaten.

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Authors
  1. Dorothy Edgington
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. King’s College, London, U.K

    D.M. Gabbay

  2. Centrum für Informations- und Sprachverarbeitung, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany

    F. Guenthner

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Edgington, D. (2007). On Conditionals. In: Gabbay, D., Guenthner, F. (eds) Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6324-4_3

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