Assessing the Convergence Thesis of Legal Reforms in Emerging Market Economies

  • Linda Elmose

This chapter argues that the post-Cold War era global phenomenon of proliferating transitional market economies are characterized by institutional diversity, rather than by neo-liberal convergence. The contention of diversity presents a direct challenge to the apparent ambition of the international community to engineer institutionally a neo-liberal economic world order, as reflected in the Good Governance development model orthodoxy. Two principal claims are made to argue why development scholars and practitioners should remain sceptical that institutional convergence is occurring or is likely to occur around the prescribed governance reforms. First, empirical evidence cannot confirm the view that these neo-liberal institutions are being progressively implemented by the fastest-growing emerging market economies. Second, and more theoretically, a set of faulty assumptions surrounding the neo-liberal conceptualization of state power and the state’s role in institutional change can be linked to a paradox, or unintended consequence, which undermines the neo-liberal ambitions for institutional convergence.


Market Economy Good Governance Governance Institution Legal Reform Emerge Market Economy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Linda Elmose
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceSimon Fraser UniversityCanada

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