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The Varieties of Normativity: An Essay on Social Ontology

  • Leo Zaibert
  • Barry Smith
Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLA, volume 41)

For much of the first fifty years of its existence, analytic philosophy shunned discussions of normativity and ethics. Ethical statements were considered as pseudo-propositions, or as expressions of pro-or con-attitudes of minor theoretical significance. Nowadays, in contrast, there are prominent analytic philosophers who pay close attention to normative problems and important books written by such philosophers on topics in law and social justice and on social and institutional ontology. Here we focus our attention on the work of Searle, at the same time drawing out an important connection between Searle’s work and that of two other seminal figures in this development: H.L.A. Hart and John Rawls.

Keywords

Intentional State Constitutive Rule Naturalistic Fallacy Illocutionary Force Evaluative Statement 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Leo Zaibert
    • 1
  • Barry Smith
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of WisconsinParksideUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyState University of New York at BuffaloBuffaloUSA

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