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Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLA,volume 41))

From its early development in the 1960s, speech act theory always had an individualistic orientation. It focused exclusively on speech acts performed by individual agents. Paradigmatic examples are ‘I promise that p’, ‘I order that p’, and ‘I declare that p’. There is a single speaker and a single hearer involved. In his book Speech Acts, for example, Searle’s analysis of promising starts from the following description: “Given that a speaker S utters a sentence T in the presence of a hearer H, then, in the literal utterance of T, S sincerely and nondefectively promises that p to H if and only if the following conditions 1–9 obtain [etc.]” (Searle 1969: 57).Though this focus may initially have been due to Searle’s methodological approach of starting his analysis of speech acts with clear-cut examples, it has led in the end to an unnecessary and undesirable bias in speech act theory.

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Meijers, A. (2007). Collective Speech Acts. In: Tsohatzidis, S.L. (eds) Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts. Theory and Decision Library, vol 41. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6104-2_4

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