Two Varieties of “Better-For” Judgements

Part of the International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine book series (LIME, volume 35)

Abstract

This paper argues against Julian Savulescu’s principle of procreative beneficence. It maintains that prospective parents have no obligation at all to choose the child, out of a range of possible children, who is likely to lead the best life. This is because a standpoint that the author labels “the internal perspective” is a perfectly appropriate one for parents to adopt when thinking about their own future children. It is only policy makers who are obliged to take up an opposing standpoint—“the external perspective”—and to be motivated by the sorts of “better for” judgements that that perspective delivers.

Keywords

Principle of procreative beneficence Savulescu Parenthood Prospective parents 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy Section, International School for Communities, Rights, and InclusionUniversity of Central LancashireUK
  2. 2.University of BoltonUK

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