SELECTION AND EXPLANATION
Part of the
BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
book series (BSPS, volume 252)
Explanations appealing to natural selection have an unusual and prima facie paradoxical feature. While we may explain general truths using such explanations, those explanations do not transfer to the particular instances of those general truths. Thus natural selection and the selective advantage of speed in escaping predators can explain why healthy, normal, adult gazelles can run fast.
KeywordsGeneral Truth Stick Insect General Proposition Selection Explanation White Object
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Achinstein, P. (1983). The Nature of Explanation
. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Armstrong, D. (1983). What is a Law of Nature?
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Dretske, F. (1977). Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science
44: 248–268.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation
. New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar