Part of the BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE book series (BSPS, volume 252)


Events have causes. We often try to explain events, and we often succeed. The causal relation is a relation in the world which either holds or fails to hold independently of how its relata are described: the relation is extensional, and its relata are normally taken to be events. The explanatory relation is, however, intensional. This means that we cannot replace a term with co-referring or coextensional terms within an explanatory context without risking that we change the truth-value of the whole. 41 I shall simply say that “explains” is an intensional relation, and I do that without thinking of this as an ontological commitment, or as something that anything really hangs on.


Good Explanation Causal Explanation Knowledge Situation Objective Explanation Causal History 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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