Part of the BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE book series (BSPS, volume 252)


Explanation is one of the most discussed notions in philosophy of science. This may be because there is little consensus among specialists on how explanation in a scientific context should be characterised. Three main approaches appear to be alive today: the formal-logical view, the ontological view, and the pragmatic view. Between these three classes of theories little agreement seems possible.


Background Knowledge Causal Explanation Scientific Explanation Reference Class Problem Context 
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