Part of the BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE book series (BSPS, volume 252)


In the following I will discuss some of the issues that an explanation-theory should address. Though it is an attempt to stay away from the question as to which particular theory that is the correct one, I will argue for and against different alternatives in ways of addressing these issues. Partly, what I will try to do is start listing some of the issues over which we, as philosophers in the theory of explanation, should make up our minds. In some cases this making up of minds will consist of agreeing on terminology and in some cases it deals with deeper questions. First I would like to clear up some terminological issues. I will use the following terms in the following way:


Probabilistic Explanation Justify Belief True Proposition Causal Claim Statistical Explanation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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