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EXPLANATION AND ENVIRONMENT

The case of psychology
  • ANNIKA WALLIN
Part of the BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE book series (BSPS, volume 252)

Abstract

The environment in which our cognitive processes operate is crucial for understanding their current form, their reliability, and their function. In the following pages I will look at the role the environment plays in psychological explanations of cognitive behaviour, also when the explanations are not of an evolutionary character. In particular, I will focus on how environmental considerations (broadly) help us explain the form or the function of a psychological process.77

Keywords

Psychological Process Object Size Cultural Adaptation Knowledge Question Psychological Explanation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Springer 2007

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  • ANNIKA WALLIN

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