Advertisement

Logical and Phenomenological Arguments Against Simulation Theory

  • Shaun Gallagher

Keywords

Mirror Neuron Propositional Attitude Simulation Theory Folk Psychology Simulation Routine 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Baird JA, Baldwin DA (2001) Making sense of human behavior: action parsing and intentional inference. In: Malle BF, Moses LJ, Baldwin DA (ed) Intentions and intentionality: foundations of social cognition. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 193–206.Google Scholar
  2. Baldwin DA, Baird JA (2001) Discerning intentions in dynamic human action. Trends Cogn Sci 5(4):171–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Bernier P (2002) From simulation to theory. In: Dokic J, Proust J (eds) Simulation and knowledge of action. Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp 33–48.Google Scholar
  4. Currie G, Ravenscroft I (2002) Recreative minds. Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
  5. deVignemont F (2004) The co-consciousness hypothesis. Phenomenol Cogn Sci 3(1):97–114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Dokic J, Proust J (2002) Introduction. In: Dokic J, Proust J (eds) Simulation and knowledge of action. Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp vii–xxi.Google Scholar
  7. Evans G (1982) The varieties of reference. In: McDowell J (ed). Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
  8. Fadiga L et al. (1995) Motor facilitation during action observation: a magnetic stimulation study. J Neurophysiol 73:2608–2611.Google Scholar
  9. Gallagher S (1997) Mutual enlightenment: recent phenomenology in cognitive science. J Conscious Stud 4(3):195–214.Google Scholar
  10. Gallagher S (2001) The practice of mind: theory, simulation, or interaction? J Conscious Stud 8(5–7):83–107.Google Scholar
  11. Gallagher S (2004) Understanding interpersonal problems in autism: interaction theory as an alternative to theory of mind. Philos Psychiatry Psychol 11(3):199–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Gallagher S (2005) Book review: a new movement in perception: review of Alva Noë’s action in perception. Times literary supplement (London).Google Scholar
  13. Gallagher S (2006) The narrative alternative to theory of mind In: Menary R (ed) Consciousness and Emotion: special issue on radical enactivism.Google Scholar
  14. Gallagher S, Hutto D (in press) Primary interaction and narrative practice: from empathic resonance to folk psychology. In: Zlatev, Racine, Sinha, Itkonen (eds) The shared mind: perspectives on intersubjectivity. Benjamins, Amsterdam.Google Scholar
  15. Gallese V (2001) The ‘shared manifold’ hypothesis: from mirror neurons to empathy. J Conscious Stud 8:33–50.Google Scholar
  16. Gallese V (2003) The roots of empathy: the shared manifold hypothesis and the neural basis of intersubjectivity. Psychopathology 36:171–180.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Gallese (2005) ‘Being like me’: self-other identity, mirror neurons and empathy. In: Hurley S, Chater N. (eds) Perspectives on imitation I. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 101–118.Google Scholar
  18. Gallese V, Goldman A (1998) Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading. Trends Cogn Sci 2:493–501.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Georgieff N, Jeannerod M (1998) Beyond consciousness of external events: a ‘Who’ system for consciousness of action and self-consciousness. Conscious Cogn 7:465–477.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Goldman AI (2002) Simulation theory and mental concepts. In: Dokic J, Proust J (eds) Simulation and knowledge of action. Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp 1–19.Google Scholar
  21. Goldman A (2005a) Mirror systems, social understanding and social cognition. Interdisciplines (http://www.interdisciplines.org/mirror/papers/3).Google Scholar
  22. Goldman A (2005b) Imitation, mind reading, and simulation. In: Hurley S, Chater N (eds) Perspectives on imitation II. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 80–81.Google Scholar
  23. Goldman AI, Sripada CS (2005) simulationist models of face-based emotion recognition. Cognition 94:193–213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Gordon RM (1995a) Folk psychology as simulation. In: Davis M, Stone T (eds) Folk psychology. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 60–73.Google Scholar
  25. Gordon RM (1995b) Developing commonsense psychology: experimental data and philosophical data. APA eastern division symposium on children’s theory of mind, December 27, 1995 (http://www.umsl.edu/∼philo/Mind_Seminar/New%20Pages/papers/Gordon/apakids9.htm).Google Scholar
  26. Gordon RM (2004) Folk psychology as mental simulation. In: Zalta N (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/folkpsych-simulation/).Google Scholar
  27. Gordon RM (2005) Intentional agents like myself. In: Hurley S, Chater N (eds) Perspectives on imitation I. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 95–106.Google Scholar
  28. Gordon R, Cruz J (2003) Simulation theory. Encyclopedia of cognitive science. The Nature Publishing Group Macmillan Reference Ltd, London.Google Scholar
  29. Grèzes J, Decety J (2001) Functional anatomy of execution, mental simulation, and verb generation of actions: a meta-analysis. Hum Brain Mapp 12:1–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Hurley SL (1998) Consciousness in action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
  31. Hurley SL (2005) Active perception and perceiving action: the shared circuits model. In: Gendler T, Hawthorne J (eds) Perceptual experience. Oxford University Press, New York.Google Scholar
  32. Hutto D (2003) Folk-psychological narratives and the case of autism. Philos Pap 33(3):345–361.Google Scholar
  33. Hutto D (2004) The limits of spectatorial folk-psychology. Mind Lang 19:548–573.Google Scholar
  34. Hutto D (in press) Unprincipled engagements: emotional experience, expression and response. In: Menary R (ed) Consciousness and emotion. Book series, vol. 7. Special issue on radical enactivism.Google Scholar
  35. Hutto D (forthcoming) Folk psychological narratives. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
  36. Jacob P (2002) The scope and limits of mental simulation. In: Dokic J, Proust J (eds) Simulation and knowledge of action. Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp 87–109.Google Scholar
  37. Jeannerod M, Pacherie E (2004) Agency, simulation, and self-identification. Mind Lang 19(2):113–146.Google Scholar
  38. Meltzoff AN (1995) Understanding the intentions of others: re-enactment of intended acts by 18-month-old children. Dev Psychol 31:838–850.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Millikan RG (2005) Some reflections on the theory theory–simulation theory debate. In: Hurley S, Chater N (eds) Perspectives on imitation II. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 182–188.Google Scholar
  40. Mitchell JP (2005) The false dichotomy between simulation and theory–theory: the argument’s error. Trends Cogn Sci 9(8):363.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Nichols S, Stich S (2003) Mindreading. Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
  42. Noë A (2004) Action in perception. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
  43. Rizzolatti G, Fadiga L, Gallese V, Fogassi L (1996) Premotor cortex and the recognition of motor actions. Cogn Brain Res 3:131–141.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Rizzolatti G, Fogassi L, Gallese, V (2000) Cortical mechanisms subserving object grasping and action recognition: a new view on the cortical motor functions. In: Gazzaniga MS (ed) The new cognitive neurosciences. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 539–552.Google Scholar
  45. Ryle G (1949) The concept of mind. Barnes and Noble, New York.Google Scholar
  46. Scheler M (1954) The nature of sympathy. Transl. by Heath P. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. Original: Wesen und Formen der Sympathie. Verlag Friedrich Cohen, Bonn, 1923.Google Scholar
  47. Varela FJ (1996) Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy for the hard problem. J Conscious Stud 3(4):330–349.Google Scholar
  48. Wittgenstein L (1958) Philosophical investigations. Transl. by Anscombe GEM. 3rd edn. Macmillan, New York.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© springer 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shaun Gallagher

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations