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From Folk Psychology to Commonsense

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Folk Psychology Re-Assessed

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Ratcliffe, M. (2007). From Folk Psychology to Commonsense. In: Hutto, D.D., Ratcliffe, M. (eds) Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5558-4_13

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