Problems With Priors in Probabilistic Measures of Coherence

  • David H. Glass


Two of the probabilistic measures of coherence discussed in this paper take probabilistic dependence into account and so depend on prior probabilities in a fundamental way. An example is given which suggests that this prior-dependence can lead to potential problems. Another coherence measure is shown to be independent of prior probabilities in a clearly defined sense and consequently is able to avoid such problems. The issue of prior-dependence is linked to the fact that the first two measures can be understood as measures of coherence as striking agreement, while the third measure represents coherence as agreement. Thus, prior (in)dependence can be used to distinguish different conceptions of coherence.


Probabilistic Measure Conditional Probability Prior Probability Neutral Point Factual Support 
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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • David H. Glass
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Computing and MathematicsUniversity of UlsterAntrimUK

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