Skip to main content

Problems With Priors in Probabilistic Measures of Coherence

  • Chapter
Coherence, Truth and Testimony

Abstract

Two of the probabilistic measures of coherence discussed in this paper take probabilistic dependence into account and so depend on prior probabilities in a fundamental way. An example is given which suggests that this prior-dependence can lead to potential problems. Another coherence measure is shown to be independent of prior probabilities in a clearly defined sense and consequently is able to avoid such problems. The issue of prior-dependence is linked to the fact that the first two measures can be understood as measures of coherence as striking agreement, while the third measure represents coherence as agreement. Thus, prior (in)dependence can be used to distinguish different conceptions of coherence.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Akiba, K.: 2000, ‘Shogenji’,s Probabilistic Measure of Coherence Is Incoherent’, Analysis 60, 356–359.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bovens, L. and S. Hartmann: 2003, Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bovens, L. and E. J. Olsson: 2000, ‘Coherentism, Reliability and Bayesian Networks’, Mind 109, 685–719.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fitelson, B.: 2003, ‘A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence’, Analysis 63, 194–199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Glass, D. H.: 2002, ‘Coherence, Explanation and Bayesian Networks’, Proceedings of the 13th Irish Conference in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science, edited by M. O’,Neill et al., Lecture Notes in AI 2646, Springer-Verlag, New York, pp. 177–182.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kemeny, J. G. and P. Oppenheim: 1952, ‘Degrees of Factual Support’, Philosophy of Science 19, 307–324.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olsson, E. J.: 2001, ‘Why Coherence Is Not Truth-Conducive’, Analysis 61, 236–241.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Olsson, E. J.: 2002, ‘What Is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?, The Journal of Philosophy 99(5), 246–272.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shogenji, T.: 1999, ‘Is Coherence Truth-Conducive?’, Analysis 59, 338–345.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shogenji, T.: 2001, ‘Reply to Akiba on the Probabilistic Measure of Coherence, Analysis 61, 147–150.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Siebel, M.: 2004, On Fitelson’s Measure of Coherence’, Analysis 64, 189–190.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2006 Springer

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Glass, D.H. (2006). Problems With Priors in Probabilistic Measures of Coherence. In: Gähde, U., Hartmann, S. (eds) Coherence, Truth and Testimony. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5547-8_5

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics