Abstract
It is shown that the probabilistic theories of coherence proposed up to now produce a number of counter-intuitive results. The last section provides some reasons for believing that no probabilistic measure will ever be able to adequately capture coherence. First, there can be no function whose arguments are nothing but tuples of probabilities, and which assigns different values to pairs of propositions (A, B) and (A, C) if A implies both B and C, or their negations, and if P(B)=P(C). But such sets may indeed differ in their degree of coherence. Second, coherence is sensitive to explanatory relations between the propositions in question. Explanation, however, can hardly be captured solely in terms of probability.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Achinstein, P.: 1983, The Nature of Explanation, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford.
Akiba, K.: 2000, ‘Shogenji’s Probabilistic Measure of Coherence Is Incoherent’, Analysis 60, 356–359.
Bartelborth, T.: 1996, Begründungsstrategien Ein Weg durch die analytische Erkenntnistheorie, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin.
BonJour, L.: 1985, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Harvard University Press, Cambridge/Mass. and London.
Bovens, L. and S. Hartmann: 2003a, ‘Solving the Riddle of Coherence’, Mind 112, 601–633.
Bovens, L. and S. Hartmann: 2003b, Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford.
Douven, I. and W. Meijs: 2006, ‘Measuring Coherence’, Synthese, to appear.
Eells, E. and B. Fitelson: 2002, ‘Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support’, Philosophical Studies 107, 129–142.
Fitelson, B.: 1999, ‘The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity’, Philosophy of Science 66 (Proceedings), 362–378.
Fitelson, B.: 2001, Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory, Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin at Madison. Online: <http://.telson.org/thesis.pdf>.
Fitelson, B.: 2003, ‘A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence’, Analysis 63, 194–199.
Fitelson, B.: 2004, ‘Two Technical Corrections to My Coherence Measure’, <http://.telson.org/coherence2.pdf>.
Hempel, C. G.: 1965, ‘Aspects of Scientific Explanation’, in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, The Free Press, New York and London, 331–496.
Kemeny, J. and P. Oppenheim: 1952, ‘Degrees of Factual Support’, Philosophy of Science 19, 307–324.
Kyburg, H. E. Jr.: 1983, ‘Recent Work in Inductive Logic’, in T. Machan & K. Lucey (eds.), Recent Work in Philosophy, Rowman and Allanheld, Totowa/NJ, 87–150.
Lewis, C. I.: 1946, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, Open Court, Chicago.
Moretti, L. and K. Akiba: 2006, ‘Probabilistic Measures of Coherence and the Problem of Belief Individuation’, Synthese, to appear.
Olsson, E.: 2002, ‘What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth’, The Journal of Philosophy 94, 246–272.
Salmon, W. C.: 1970, ‘Statistical Explanation’, in R. G. Colodny (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp. 173–231.
Shogenji, T.: 1999, ‘Is Coherence Truth Conducive?’, Analysis 59, 338–345.
Shogenji, T.: 2001, ‘Reply to Akiba on the Probabilistic Measure of Coherence’, Analysis 61, 147–150.
Siebel, M.: 2004, ‘On Fitelson’s Measure of Coherence’, Analysis 64, 189–190.
Siebel, M.: 2005, ‘Thagard’,s Measure of Coherence: Corrected and Compared with Probabilistic Accounts’, submitted to synthese.
Siebel, M. and W. Wol.: 2005, ‘Equivalent Testimonies as a Touchstone of Coherence Measures’, manuscript.
Thagard, P.: 1992, Conceptual Revolutions, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Thagard, P. and K. Verbeurgt: 1998, ‘Coherence as Constraint Satisfaction’, Cognitive Science 22, 1–24.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2006 Springer
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Siebel, M. (2006). Against Probabilistic Measures of Coherence. In: Gähde, U., Hartmann, S. (eds) Coherence, Truth and Testimony. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5547-8_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5547-8_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-4426-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-5547-8
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)