Abstract
This paper examines the role of coherence of evidence in what I call the non-dynamic model of confirmation. It appears that other things being equal, a higher degree of coherence among pieces of evidence raises to a higher degree the probability of the proposition they support. I argue against this view on the basis of three related observations. First, we should be able to assess the impact of coherence on any hypothesis of interest the evidence supports. Second, the impact of coherence among the pieces of evidence can be different on different hypotheses of interest they support. Third, when we assess the impact of coherence on a hypothesis of interest, other conditions that should be held equal for a fair assessment include the degrees of individual support which the propositions directly supported by the respective pieces of evidence provide for the hypothesis. Once we take these points into consideration, the impression that coherence of evidence plays a positive role in confirmation dissipates. In some cases it can be shown that other things being equal, a higher degree of coherence among the pieces of evidence reduces the degree of confirmation for the hypothesis they support.
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© 2006 Springer
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Shogenji, T. (2006). The Role of Coherence of Evidence in the Non-Dynamic Model of Confirmation. In: Gähde, U., Hartmann, S. (eds) Coherence, Truth and Testimony. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5547-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5547-8_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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