Changing Concepts

Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 256)

The paper is an appendix to the previous chapter. It observes that that chapter speaks rather of concept stages than of concepts. This raises the question how it can make sense to speak not only of various concept stages, but of one changing concept, i.e., what holds the various stages of a concept together so as to form one concept persisting through its possible changes. The paper rejects three possible answers and endorses two further ones.


Conceptual Change Natural Kind Belief Change Philosophical Concept Standard Conception 
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© Springer Science + Business Media B.V 2009

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