Two Coherence Principles

Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 256)

The paper proposes two principles of coherence, thus continuing work started in previous chapter. They indeed serve as weak, but precise explications of the notion of coherence as it is used in the current epistemological discussion. After discussing their epistemological setting (sections 10.2-3), the paper considers four ways of establishing these principles. They may be inferred neither from enumerative induction (section 10.4), nor from the nature of propositions as objects of belief (section 10.5), nor in a Kantian way from self-consciousness (section 10.6). Rather, I propose a fairly rigorous way to infer them from an even more fundamental rationality principle of non-dogmatism and an elementary theory of perception (section 10.7).


Ranking Function Inductive Logic Basic Belief Reason Relation Doxastic State 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media B.V 2009

Personalised recommendations