Abstract
A year ago, we argued that in the later Wittgenstein one has to distinguish primary from secondary language-games when he discusses our language of mental experiences.1 Primary language games establish the basic links between language and our experiences; secondary ones build on them and at the same time modify them. It is only by means of secondary language-games that we bring such notions as knowledge, certainty, evidence, and justification to bear on our talk about mental experiences, for instance sensations.
Written jointly with Merrill B. Hintikka
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Notes
See Merrill H. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, “Different Language-Games in Wittgenstein”, in Elisabeth Leinfellner et al. (eds.), Language, Logic, and Philosophy (Proceedings of the Fourth Wittgenstein Symposium 1979 ) Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Wien 1980, pp. 171–176.
Anscombe translates the last sentence of the quoted passage as follows: “Then are my words for sensations tied up with my natural expressions of sensation?” This makes Wittgenstein sound much more tentative than the text seems to us to warrant. Furthermore, German also does not have the force of an initial “then” but rather that of “therefore” or “thus”.
Cf. also: “chrw(133)my workchrw(133)should really express itself in its own languagechrw(133)” (On Modern Art, Faber and Faber, London 1948 ).
Lopez-Rey, José, Goya’s Caprichos I-77, Princeton U.P., 1953, volume I, p. 77.
Lopez-Rey (1953), pp. 57–66, 75–84.
See L6pez-Rey (1953), p.65.
L6pez-Rey (1953) p. 66.
On Physiognomic Perception“, in G. Kepes (ed.), The Visual Arts Today (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1960); reprinted in E.H. Gombrich, Meditations on a Hobby Horse,Phaidon Press, London 1963, pp. 45–55.
Gombrich (1963), pp. 47–48.
Gombrich (1963), pp. 49–50.
Concept as Vision“, in Jaakko Hintikka, The Intentions of Intentionality (D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1975).
Cf. Kahnweiler’s summary of Picasso’s views: “He meant that Cubism was the only honest painting and that honest painting could be conceived only in the form of language with invented signs and no attempt at imitation”. (`Voice of the Artist III“, in The Observer (8 December 1957).)
By reference to the well-known Wittgensteinian legend, we may perhaps say that it is a pity that Sraffa did not ask, apropos an indescribable Italian gesture, not only “What is its logical form?” but also, “What is it a natural expression oft”
For instance, Jaakko Hintikka has argued that the “logical home” of quantifiers are various language-games of seeking and finding and that these games can in principle be recognized behaviorally, thus facilitating the radical translation of quantifiers. See his “Language-Games for Quantifiers” and `Behavioral Criteria of Radical Translation“ in Logic, Language-Games, and Information, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1973. These language-games of seeking and finding are surely primary ones in the sense of not being based on or parasitic on anything more basic.
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Hintikka, J. (1996). Wittgenstein and ‘The Universal Language’ of Painting. In: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-4109-9_16
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