Abstract
There is an inveterate tendency among philosophers to view their distinguished predecessors and colleagues in terms of fixed doctrines or systems, antagonisms between such doctrines, and inexplicable moves from one doctrine to another rather than in terms of dialectical development and progressive problem-solving. Jaakko Hintikka has protested against this tendency in the case of Aristotle and tried to produce a counter-example.1 It is even more distressing to find a contemporary or near-contemporary figure subjected to a similar treatment. It seems to us that this fate has befallen Wittgenstein to a far greater extent than has been recognized. This paper is a modest attempt to put the dynamics of Wittgenstein’s development into perspective by using a few key concepts as our focal points. They include the notions of showing, ostensive definition, language game, rule, and criterion, Our attempt if based on our earlier joint work on Wittgenstein. 2 For reasons of space, we have to assume that the reader has some familiarity with our earlier papers.
Written jointly with Merrill B. Hintikka
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Notes
Introduction to Jaakko Hintikka et al., Aristotle on Modality and Determinism (Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 29, no. 1), North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1977, and ibid. passim.
See Merrill Provence and Jaakko Hintikka, »Wittgenstein on Privacy and Publicity», in Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought, Proceedings of the Second International Wittgenstein Symposium, Holder-PichlerTempsky, Vienna, 1978, pp. 353–362; Merrill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, »Different Language-Games in Wittgenstein», in Language, Logic, and Philosophy, Proceedings of the Fourth International Wittgenstein Symposium, HölderPichler-Tempsky, Vienna, 1980, pp. 417–422; Merrill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, »Wittgenstein and the ‘Universal Language’ of Painting», forthcoming in the Proceedings of the Fifth International Wittgenstein Symposium, HölderPichler-Tempsky, Vienna, 1981; and cf. Jaakko Hintikka, »Language-Games» in Jaakko Hintikka et al., Essays on Wittgenstein in Honour of G.H. von Wright (Acta Philosophical Fennica, vol. 28, nos. 1–3), North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1976, pp. 105–125; Jaakko Hintikka, »Wittgenstein’s Semantical Kantianism» forthcoming in the Proceedings of the Fifth International Wittgenstein Symposium, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna, 1981.
See »Language-Games» and »Wittgenstein’s Semantical Kantianism», note 2 above.
It is not clear what this refers to. It might refer to the Tractatus, but it might also pertain to his discussions with Waismann.
G. E. M. Anscombe translates »worin diese Beziehung etwa besteht» as »the sort of thing this relation consists in». It is nevertheless fairly clear that the leeway Wittgenstein wants to leave is different from what Anscombe’s translation suggests. Wittgenstein certainly thought that from his language-games we can see more than merely the sort of relation naming relations are. We can see what precisely it is in this case, i.e. what precise relation it can be (in some cases). That this is in fact Wittgenstein’s point is conclusively shown by The Brown Book, p. 173.
This seems to us characteristic of Wittgenstein’s development in general. He repeatedly came upon new insights by considering specific problems but realized their wider applicability only later. Another case in point is his discussion of rule-following in Philosophical Investigations which can be thought of as a generalization of his earlier comments on reading.
See »Language-Games» (note 2 above).
See »Different Language-Games in Wittgenstein» (note 2 above).
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Hintikka, J. (1996). Wittgenstein: Some Perspectives on the Development of His Thought. In: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-4109-9_13
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