Awareness of Objects
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How does a subject become aware of some (e.g., external) objects? An answer to this question, I think, can be given only when one recognizes that there are two distinct language games which are essentially connected with our concept of becoming aware of an object. I shall try to show that although both these games are necessary in order for us to have our present concept of being aware of something, they are quite distinct games, and can be played independently of each other. The question “What does an awareness of X consist in?” will thus be shown to be essentially misguided, and its apparent meaningfulness due only to our tendency to commit a conceptual short-circuit here and lose sight of the fact that our epistemic game is actually two games played together in a certain way. Thus I shall attempt to show that the question, “What does awareness of an entity consist in?” is wrong headed in exactly the same way that the question, “What is the chemical constitution of a trump card?” is wrong: they can only be due to a conceptual confusion about the nature of these games.
KeywordsSense Perception Relay Station Language Game Intentional Object Conceptual Confusion
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