Classifying Phenomena and Data

The value of classifying the phenomena that scientists study may seem particularly obvious. If scientists do not comprehend the identity of the phenomena they study, they are unlikely to proceed very far in understanding how particular phenomena evolve or influence each other. “In the [natural] sciences the development of ‘pure’ elements and homogenous, stable phenomena was a key point in the emergence of modern chemistry and other natural sciences …” (Whitley, 2000, 122). As Singleton and Strait note (1999, 19-20), “science makes a great fuss about language; observations must be precisely and reliably reported; terms must be carefully defined, with clear referents; and the phenomena to which a scientific discipline addresses itself must be organized and classified in a meaningful way.” Sadly, though, while the need for classification may be obvious, the difficulties inherent in the task have prevented most disciplines from achieving “meaningful classification.” At the level of the modern scientific enterprise as a whole, the task has not even been attempted. Among the unfortunate side effects of this situation is the arbitrary nature of disciplinary boundaries: without a logical classification of phenomena to guide them it is hardly surprising that disciplines do not pursue a logical division of the terrain. In some cases several disciplines may share a phenomenon (often without paying heed to the efforts of other disciplines to comprehend it); in other cases a phenomenon may be ignored by all.