Natural Ends And The End Of Nature

Naturalizing Kant's teleology
  • Paul Guyer
Part of the Boston Studies In The Philosophy Of Science book series (BSPS, volume 241)

Kant’s Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment was clearly his response to Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Hume’s Dialogues seem to be a withering criticism of the argument from design, yet Kant apparently wanted to salvage something from the wreckage of traditional teleology. It may be hard to see why he would have thought he could do so until we see that Hume’s attack is not in fact a complete rejection of traditional teleology.


Mechanical Explanation Pure Reason Human Happiness Intelligent Ground Pure Practical Reason 
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© Springer 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul Guyer
    • 1
  1. 1.University of PennsylvaniaUSA

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