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On the Meaning of Owen—Banzhaf Coalitional Value in Voting Situations

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Essays in Cooperative Games

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLC,volume 36))

Abstract

In this paper we discuss the meaning of Owen’s coalitional extension of the Banzhaf index in the context of voting situations. It is discussed the possibility of accommodating this index within the following model: in order to evaluate the likelihood of a voter to be crucial in making a decision by means of a voting rule a second input (apart from the rule itself) is necessary: an estimate of the probability of different vote configurations. It is shown how Owen’s coalitional extension can be seen as three different normative variations of this model.

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References

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Correspondence to Annick Laruelle or Federico Valenciano .

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© 2004 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Laruelle, A., Valenciano, F. (2004). On the Meaning of Owen—Banzhaf Coalitional Value in Voting Situations. In: Gambarelli, G. (eds) Essays in Cooperative Games. Theory and Decision Library, vol 36. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2936-3_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2936-3_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5260-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-2936-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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