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A Note on the Owen Set of Linear Programming Games and Nash Equilibria

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Book cover Essays in Cooperative Games

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLC,volume 36))

Abstract

In this paper we associate a strategic non-cooperative game to a linear programming game; we analyze the relations between the core of the given game and the Nash equilibria of the strategic game.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Scienze e Tecnologie Avanzate, Università del Piemonte Orientale, Piazza Giorgio Ambrosoli, 5, 15100, Alessandria, Italy

    Vito Fragnelli

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  1. Vito Fragnelli
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Correspondence to Vito Fragnelli .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Bergamo, Italy

    Gianfranco Gambarelli

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© 2004 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Fragnelli, V. (2004). A Note on the Owen Set of Linear Programming Games and Nash Equilibria. In: Gambarelli, G. (eds) Essays in Cooperative Games. Theory and Decision Library, vol 36. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2936-3_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2936-3_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5260-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-2936-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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