Abstract
In this paper we study coalitions of indirect stockholders of a company showing that they can have different controlling power, and therefore different relevance in the control problem. We then introduce a suitable classification, and three algorithms to find all the coalitions of all relevances.
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References
Denti, E. and Prati, N. (2001), An algorithm for winning coalitions in indirect control of corporations, Decisions in Economics and Finance 24, 153–158.
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© 2004 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Denti, E., Prati, N. (2004). Relevance of Winning Coalitions in Indirect Control of Corporations. In: Gambarelli, G. (eds) Essays in Cooperative Games. Theory and Decision Library, vol 36. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2936-3_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2936-3_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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