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Relevance of Winning Coalitions in Indirect Control of Corporations

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Essays in Cooperative Games

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLC,volume 36))

Abstract

In this paper we study coalitions of indirect stockholders of a company showing that they can have different controlling power, and therefore different relevance in the control problem. We then introduce a suitable classification, and three algorithms to find all the coalitions of all relevances.

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References

  • Denti, E. and Prati, N. (2001), An algorithm for winning coalitions in indirect control of corporations, Decisions in Economics and Finance 24, 153–158.

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  • Prati, N. (2002), Giochi Cooperativi senza Impegno Totale: Una Introduzione. Working Paper Dipartimento Finanza dell’ Impresa e dei Mercati Finanziari, Universita’ di Udine 2–2002 (in Italian).

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Correspondence to Enrico Denti or Nando Prati .

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© 2004 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Denti, E., Prati, N. (2004). Relevance of Winning Coalitions in Indirect Control of Corporations. In: Gambarelli, G. (eds) Essays in Cooperative Games. Theory and Decision Library, vol 36. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2936-3_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2936-3_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5260-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-2936-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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