Abstract
In this paper replicator dynamics are introduced to describe the propagation of coalitionist behaviour in conflicts given by a two-strategy bimatrix games. In the proposed approach non-coalitionists play either Nash strategies or choose one of two pure strategies. In the first case it is proved that non-coalitionists are asymptotically eliminated. In the second case coalitionists can propagate without eliminating all non-coalitionists.
The research was supported by the Hungarian National Research Fund (OTKA) No. T037271. The final version was completed while one of the authors (R.C.) was a Fellow at the Collegium Budapest.
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Cressman, R., Garay, J., Scarelli, A., Varga, Z. (2004). The Dynamic Stability of Coalitionist Behaviour for Two-Strategy Bimatrix Games. In: Gambarelli, G. (eds) Essays in Cooperative Games. Theory and Decision Library, vol 36. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2936-3_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2936-3_11
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