Abstract
It is argued that (philosophical) ontology is supervenient on the ontological commitments of empirical science, and that therefore the idea of the unity of being depends on the unity of science. What prospects are there for the latter? The aim of this paper is not to provide an ultimate answer to this question but rather to sketch the conceptual framework with in which the question can be discussed in precise terms. Four notions are decisive for such a framework: ontological commitment of an empirical theory, reduction, fundamental theory, and compatibility of theories. By using the idea that every theory is uniquely associated with a class of models (in the sense of formal semantics), an attempt is made to explicate formally these four notions; this, in turn, provides the adequate base to decide the question of the unity of science, and therefore of being. In particular, it is shown that, even though it might be unavoidable to have several, not mutually reducible, fundamental theories, there could still be a sense in which we might speak of a unified ontological system, when the fundamental theories are not mutually incompatible (in the sense specified in this article).
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Moulines, C.U. (2009). The Unity of Science and The Unity of Being: a Sketch of a Formal Approach. In: Rahman, S., Symons, J., Gabbay, D.M., Bendegem, J.P.v. (eds) Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Logic, Epistemology, And The Unity Of Science, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2808-3_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2808-3_9
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