Environmental Impacts of the Ganges Water Diversion and its International Legal Aspects

  • Md. Nazrul Islam
Part of the Water Science and Technology Library book series (WSTL, volume 49)

Abstract

Planned measures on shared rivers and lakes have long been a source of enormous tension between riparian states.1 The environmental dimensions of such measures are also recognized in comparatively recent reports and documents. The World Commission on Dams, in its Report of 2000, observed that large dams and diversion projects can lead to the loss of forests and wildlife habitat, aquatic biodiversity, and can affect downstream flood plains, wetlands, riverine, estuarine, and adjacent marine ecosystem.2 The Commission therefore underscored the necessity of “identifying the legitimate claims and entitlement” involved in such projects.3

Keywords

Assure Egypt Argentina Harness 

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Md. Nazrul Islam
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of LawUniversity of DhakaDhakaBangladesh

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