Abstract
In this chapter and the next I want to take notice of the special relationship between fallacy theory and informal logic. Most of fallacy theory has nothing to do with the logical forms investigated by systems such as FDL (formal deductive logic). So it is reasonable to see most of fallacy theory as informal logic. At one time, I was inclined to the skeptical view that there was nothing to informal logic but fallacy theory. Now I am pretty sure that this is wrong. As will become clear, the fundamental question for informal logic is its connection or lack of it to the idea of logical form.
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Of course not every adjustment of one’s belief-stock is accomplished inferentially. A change in retinal stimuli may well lead to a change in belief (of what you see), but this is not inference (pace Peirce). For more on the type of belief-adjustment that inference is, see [Gabbay and Woods, 2003].
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© 2004 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Woods, J. (2004). The Necessity of Formalism. In: The Death of Argument. Applied Logic Series, vol 32. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2712-3_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2712-3_2
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