Verdi is the Puccini of Music

Abstract

In the preceding chapter, analogical arguments were construed as meta-arguments; as arguments about arguments in which it is claimed that they instantiate some common deep structure. Analogical predications aren’t arguments at all; they are statements. They raise the hard question of what their truth conditions might be. This question is the business of the present chapter. It is appropriate to sound a warning right at the beginning. Some people are of the view that the secrets of analogical predication cannot be captured by truth conditions [Lichter, 1995]. In this they may be correct. Perhaps analogical predication is better investigated pragmatically, that is, in terms of how they are characteristically used in speech [Thagard et al., 1990]. This is not something to be dogmatic about. The best course is an (energetic) open mind. I am not ready to give up on the truth conditional approach. It is all grist for the mill of the larger question posed by the fallacy of false analogy: “What are analogies anyhow? What good are analogies? Why bother with them? What is the purpose of trying to establish a mapping between two things that do not map onto one another in reality? The answer surely is very complex, but the heart of it must be that it is good for our survival (or our genes’ survival), because we do it all the time” [Hofstadter, 1986, p. 556].

Co-authored with Brent Hudak.