Discussion in previous chapters has revealed a number of challenges facing proportionalism; challenges which, if they are genuine, in various ways question the idea of proportionate punishment. However, when a philosophical theory - as well as a theory in other fields of research - is faced with problems, there are different ways in which adherents to the theory might react if they do not straightforwardly give in and accept the criticism. One obvious possibility is to seek to show that the criticism should be considered flawed or misplaced and that, therefore, on closer inspection there are no genuine problems facing the theory after all. Another approach is to admit that there is something to the criticism but to hold that the outlined problems are not fatal since, for instance, they can be avoided by slight modifications of non-essential parts of the theory under attack. During the foregoing discussions, responses of the first sort have been considered, none of which - at least so I have suggested - have succeeded in proving the problems insubstantial. The time has now come to direct attention to the second sort of response, that is, to consider revisionist accounts of proportionalism.
KeywordsDistribution Principle Punishment System Punishment Level Proportionality Principle Proportionality Constraint
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