Derek Parfit has famously pointed out that ‘total’ utilitarian views, such as classical hedonistic utilitarianism, lead to the conclusion that, to each population of quite happy persons there corresponds a more extensive population with people living lives just worth living, which is (on the whole) better. In particular, for any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living. This world is better if the sum total of well being is great enough, and it is great enough if only many enough sentient beings inhabit it. This conclusion has been considered by Parfit and others to be ‘repugnant’.
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© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Tännsjö, T. (2004). Why We Ought To Accept The Repugnant Conclusion. In: Tännsjö, T., Ryberg, J. (eds) The Repugnant Conclusion. Library Of Ethics And Applied Philosophy, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2473-3_12
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