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Formal Theory and Regime Effectiveness: Rational Players, Irrational Regimes

  • Chapter
Regime Consequences

Abstract

Global and regional environmental problems are frequently conceptualised as collective action failures. Environmental quality is a public good. If it is provided, it can be enjoyed whether or not an individual or a nation has made sacrifices to maintain it. So it may well be rational to free-ride on others’ contributions to the solution of the problem, unless there are strong nation-specific benefits from cooperating.1 This often leads to the failure to maintain global environmental quality. Starting with Keohane (1984), international regimes have been seen as encouraging nations rationally pursuing their various interests to co-operate to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case, so long as others do so as well. This argument partly derives from game-theoretic models of collective action. Despite the important contribution game-theory has made, many scholars believe that it has definite limitations. Regimes can raise awareness of issues, change perceptions of problems and nations’ interests in their solution, or act as a locus for institutionally-based learning about possible policy responses. Furthermore, they can act as the sites where normative discourses about what is proper to do and who should pay the price contend for dominance. Some doubt whether these processes can adequately be understood within a rational-choice framework based on actors choosing efficient means to given ends.

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  1. Department of Government, University of Essex, UK

    Hugh Ward, Grank Grundig & Ethan Zorick

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Ward, H., Grundig, G., Zorick, E. (2004). Formal Theory and Regime Effectiveness: Rational Players, Irrational Regimes. In: Regime Consequences. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2208-1_7

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