Abstract
At the end of the 19th century, when the discipline called psychology is said to have become “independent”1, attention began to be focused towards nominalistic philosophy from a point of view that can be called psychological. At that time, Vienna, the capital of the AustroHungarian Dual Monarchy, was a center for several disciplines. It is no wonder that it was there that the research concerning the psychological themes of William Ockham and other nominalists began. Karl Werner (1821–1888), a Catholic, neo-scholastic scholar, professor of New Testament studies at the University of Vienna (1870), and a member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences (1874), seems to have planned a history of medieval psychology. However, only fragments of it were printed, among them the following articles: ‘Der Averroismus in der christlich-peripatetischen Psychologie des späteren Mittelalters’ (1881), ‘Die nominalisirende Psychologie der Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters’ (1881) and ‘Die augustinische Psychologie in ihrer mittelalterlich-scholastischen Einkleidung and Gestaltung’ (1882).2 Werner deals especially with Ockham’s Psychology, among other things, in the second of these articles.
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References
See Kusch 1995 and 1999.
Pluta 1987, 12–13. See Werner 1881a, 1881b, 1882. (Those three texts were republished in 1964 under the name Psychologie des Mittelalters.) Prior to those books, Werner had written about William of Auvergne’s, Bonaventure’s, John Duns Scotus’s and Roger
Bacon’s psychology, and about the development of the medieval psychology from Alcuin to Albert the Great. See Pluta 1987, 13, 159.
Siebeck 1888–1889, 1888–1890.
Siebeck 1897. In 1898 he briefly wrote about Ockham’s theory of the will in his article‘Die Willenslehre bei Duns Scotus und seinen Nachfolgern’ (pp. 195–199). Siebeck 1898.
Kugler 1913.
Federhofer 1923.
Federhofer 1926.
Hochstetter 1927.
Gilson 1937 (reprint. in 1982), 86–91. See Adams 1987, 588–589; Georgedes 1995, 13–14.
See Boehner 1958.
Léon Baudry who wrote briefly about passions (“moral passions”) in his Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d’Ockham (1958) ended his article on them by stating: “La théorie ockhamiste des passions mériterait de faire l’objet d’une étude plus approfondie.” Baudry 1958, 193. See McGrade 1981, 707; 1986, 153, and Courtenay 1987, 283.
Fuchs 1952.
Leff 1975.
Holopainen 1991.
McGrade 1981.
Georgedes 1995.
Damiata 1997.
Etzkorn presented his paper in 1988 and published it in 1990 under the name Ockham’s View of the Human Passions in the Light of his Philosophical Anthropology’. Etzkorn 1990b.
Marilyn McCord Adams and Calvin Normore also emphasize Ockham’ s ontological interest: “Ockham’s philosophical focus, whether he is doing logic, natural science, or theology, is on the branch of metaphysics commonly called ontology’ .” Adams 1987, 3. “Like Professor M. Adams, I see Ockham as primarily an ontologist whose ultimate concern is the metaphysical furniture of the world.” Normore 1987, 212.
Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica. Ad fidem codicum manuscriptorum edita. Cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University. 1967–1986. I have occasionally made references even to the (probably) inauthentic texts ascribed to Ockham in OPh VII. Also, I have frequently used Summula philosophiae naturalis, the authenticity of which has also been sometimes questioned; see for example Brampton 1964, Weisheipl 1968, Richter 1975 and 1986, and Leibold 1982 and 1987. However, the doubts presented have also been criticized; see for example Miethke 1967, and Brown 1987. James A. Weisheipl’s doubts are based (among other things) on the position of the form in Summula. He claims that in Summula, Ockham argues on the assumption of the unicity of the substantial form rather than the plurality which he holds to in his commentary on the Sentences and Quodlibeta septem. Weisheipl 1968, 172–173. I, however, agree with Gordon Leff who says: “Ockham in the Summulae is for most of the time treating form generically in the abstract.” Leff 1975, 565. Besides, it is never explicitly said in Summula that there is only one form in the human being. Occasionally, the authenticity of some other texts usually considered to be Ockham’s has been doubted, too; see for instance Richter 1986, 95–105. As this is the case, I have tried to document all my claims with ample textual evidence.
Some researchers have thought that Ockham intended to write an exposition on Aristotle’s On the Soul, Nicomachean Ethics, and Metaphysics. See Quaest. variae, q. VI, a. 9; OTh VIII, 251, footnote 3; SL III-3, c. 6; OPh I, 610, footnote 10; SL III-3, c. 24; OPh I, 685, footnote 3.
Knuuttila 2002. For medieval psychology, see also Harvey 1975.
For Ockham’s theory of signification, see SL I, c. 33; OPh I, 95–96: 2–54.
Ockham on categorematic and syncategorematic terms, see SL I, c. 4; OPh I, 15–16: 4–34.
“...`caritas’ dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo praecise pro quodam habitu absoluto infuso, et sic non est nomen connotativum. Aliter accipitur‘caritas’ ut est abstractum respectu istius concreti‘carom’, connotando aliquem cui fille est carus.” Ord. I, d. 17; q. 1; OTh III, 466: 15–19. “...`angelus’ est nomen mere absolutum, saltem si non sit nomen officii sed tantum substantiae.” SL I, c. 10; OPh I, 36: 23–24.
“Nomina mere absoluta sunt illa quae non significant aliquid principaliter et aliud vel idem secundario, sed quidquid significatur per illud nomen, aeque primo significatur, sicut patet de hoc nomine‘animal’ quod non significat nisi boves, asinos et homines, et sic de aliis animalibus, et non significat unum primo et aliud secundario, ita quod oporteat aliquid significari in recto et aliud in obliquo...” SL I, c. 10; OPh I, 35: 6–12. See also Quodl. V, q. 25; OTh IX, 583: 15–22.
“...de nominibus mere absolutis quod stricte loquendo nullum eorum habet definitionem exprimentem quid nominis. Talia autem nomina sunt huiusmodi‘homo’,‘animal’,‘capra’, ‘lapis’, ‘arbor’,‘ignis’ , ‘terra’, ‘aqua’,‘caelum’ ,‘albedo’ ,‘ni gredo’ ,‘calor’ ,‘dulcedo’ ,‘odor’,‘sapor’ et huiusmodi.” SL I, c. 10; OPh I, 36: 32–37. “...quidam sunt termini absoluti, qui significant sua significata aeque primo et uno modo significandi. Et istorum terminorum quidam important substantias et quidam qualitates, sicut‘homo’,‘animal’,‘albedo’,‘nigredo’. Alii sunt termini connotativi.” Quodl. VI, q. 16; OTh IX, 642: 68–72.
Panaccio 1990, 3; 1995, 190; 1999a, 267; 1999b, 56.
Normore 1987, 212.
“Nomen autem connotativum est illud quod significat aliquid primario et aliquid secundario.” SL I, c. 10; OPh I, 36: 38–39. However, according to Michael J. Loux, “Ockham’s subsequent use of the term‘connotative’ is such that terms which have significata2 but no signiicatal can be connotative”. Loux 1974, 7. See also Spade 1996, 203.
Spade 1996, 213. (References to Ockham, see esp. SL I, c. 10; OPh I, 37–38: 52–94.)
About the discussion of whether there are connotative terms in mental language, see Spade 1975, 55, 64–76; Boler 1985; Adams 1987, 289, 297–298, 322–323; Normore 1990, 58; Spade 1990, 599–608; Panaccio 1990; 1992, 31–35, 94–96, 240–245; Tweedale 1992; Goddu 1993, 108–123; Michon 1994, 364–379; Leffler 1995, 187; Spade 1996, 187–239; Yrjönsuuri 1997, 19–21; Chalmers 1999, 95–96.
Adams 1987, 324. Reference to Ockham: SL III-2, c. 29; OPh I, 558–560: 47–100.
Spade 1990, 602, footnote 18.
Normore 1990, 59. Normore does not mention the possibility that the intuitive cognitions of the objects, on which the absolute terms are based, do not need to be caused by the objects themselves but they can be caused by God. See footnote 7 on page 77 below. Calvin Normore and Deborah Brown suggest that, according to Ockham, absolute terms are neither innate nor learned, but passively acquired. See Normore 1990, 59–61; Brown 1996, esp. 86–87.
“Definitio exprimens quid rei, non data per additamentum, semper continet pro prima parte aliquid genus definiti et pro alia parte vel pro aliis partibus continet differentiam vel differentias essentiales vel aliquos obliquos significantes per se et primo partes rei. Et istae partes sunt diversae; nam genus importat totum, aliae partes significant partes distinctas rei.” SL III-2, c. 29; OPh I, 557: 3–8. “...si aliqua res debeat definiri, primo ponendum est
genus, secundo addendae sunt differentiae essentiales vel accidentales.” SL I, c. 20; OPh I, 69: 39–41. Marilyn McCord Adams states that this definition “expresses the nature of the thing in its extension”. Adams 1987, 323. Paul Vincent Spade says that these definitions are the ones “that somehow reflect the internal metaphysical make-up of the objects defined”. Spade 1990, 599.
“...causa quare genus praedicatur in quid, et non differentia, est ista, quia genus importat totam rem et non plus unam partem quam aliam, et ideo praedicatur in quid...” Exp. Porph. Praed., c. 7; OPh II, 102: 6–9. For more about the genus, see, for instance, SL III-3, c. 18; OPh I, 651–671: 3–580.
About difference, see for instance SL I, c. 23; OPh I, 74–78: 2–127. About the other terms predicable in quid of the thing, see the definition of the human being in natural philosophy in sub-chapter 2.1.
In other sciences there may be definitions that also express what the thing is, but only such which include terms referring to non-essential aspects in the thing. For references to Ockham’s texts, see the definitions of the human being, sub-chapter 2.1. 40
“...definitio exprimens quid rei est solum nominum absolutorum...” Quodl. V, q. 19; OTh IX, 555: 51–52.
“Quaedam enim definitio talis est quae nihil importat extrinsecum rei alio modo quam importat rem vel partem rei. Et talis definitio vocatur definitio propriissime dicta, quae non potest esse nisi substantiarum vel nominum substantiarum, quia talis definitio non potest
esse nisi compositorum, tamquam illorum quorum essentia exprimitur per orationem, cuiusmodi composita per se una non sunt nisi substantiae. Talis definitio est ista‘animal rationale’; sit‘animal’ genus et‘rationale’ differentia, quia‘animal’ importat totum hominem et‘rationale’ importat partem hominis sicut suum abstractum.” SL III-2, c. 28; OPh I, 556: 19–27. See also SL III-3, c. 23; OPh I, 682: 16–19.
“...nullum simplex potest definiri definitione proprie dicta quae sit data ex genere et differentia essentiali. Quia cum nullum simplex possit habere differentiam essentialem, nullum simplex potest definiri tali definitione. Et ista est causa Philosophi quare accidens non potest definiri definitione proprie dicta. Unde nec dependentia accidentis ad substantiam, nec imperfectio accidentis, nec aliquid tale est causa quare non potest definiri, sed sola simplicitas propter quam caret differentia essentiali. Et propter eandem rationem, forma substantialis et angelus et materia substantialis et caetera simplicia — quaecumque sint illa — non possunt definiri definitione proprie dicta.” Ord. I, d. 8, q. 3; OTh III, 208: 22 — 209: 7. (See also ibid., 209: 8 — 214: 18.) Scotus also denied universal hylomorphism according to which all created substances are composed of form and matter. See Williams 2001, 8. It has to be noticed that there are, according to Ockham, various kinds of simplicity: “Simplicium vero quaedam carent omni compositione partium quarumcumque, cuiusmodi sunt substantiae abstractae intellectuales, scilicet intelligentiae; cuiusmodi sunt etiam omnes intellectiones et omnia accidentia animae intellectivae, si ipsa sit indivisibilis, sicut multi ponunt esse de intentione Aristotelis. Quaedam autem simplicia dicuntur non per carentiam partium quarumcumque sed per carentiam partium dissimilium et alterius rationis, cuiusmodi sunt omnia corpora caelestia secundum intentionem Aristotelis, et omnia accidentia corporalia et materia prima et forma quaelibet.” Summ. phil. nat., praeamb.; OPh VI, 154: 423–431. (Here and elsewhere I have underlined the spread words.)
“Alia est definitio importans quid rei, quae simul cum hoc quod importat rem, importat vel exprimit aliquid quod non est de essentia rei; sicut definitio animae, quae est ista‘actus corporis physici organici’ etc. importat animam et corpus, quod non est pars animae nec anima. Et ista vocatur definitio per additamentum. Et tales definitiones importantes quid rei convertuntur cum nominibus mere absolutis affirmativis.” SL III-2, c. 28; OPh I, 556: 28–33. “Definitio data per additamentum non solum explicat essentiam rei, sed etiam simul cum hoc explicat aliquid aliud a re, et hoc vel affirmative vel negative. Et ideo talis definitio non solum componitur ex aliquo praedicabili per se primo modo, sed etiam componitur ex
aliquibus praedicabilibus secundo modo, quae sunt passiones definiti.” SL III-2, c. 32; OPh I, 566: 3–7. “Alia est definitio data per additamentum, quae scilicet habet aliquam partern importantem aliquid extrinsecum illi quod importatur per definitum...” SL III-3, c. 23; OPh I, 682: 20–22.
SL III-2, c. 32; OPh I, 566–567: 3–36. See also SL III-3, c. 23; OPh I, 682: 20–24; c. 25; OPh I, 688: 2–12; Exp. Porph. Praed., c. 2; OPh II, 46: 55–62. See also Moody 1935 (republ. 1965), 274–275; Webering 1953, 115–116; Leff 1975, 304–308.
SL III-2, c. 33; OPh I, 568–569: 2–46.
“Definitio exprimens quid nominis est quando exprimitur significatum vocabuli, quid scilicet debemus per vocabulum intelligere.” SL III-3, c. 23; OPh I, 682: 9–10. “Definitio autem exprimens quid nominis est oratio explicite declarans quid per unam dictionem importatur, sicut alicuis volens docere alium quid significat hoc nomen‘album’ dicit quod significat idem quod haec oratio‘aliquid habens albedinem’.” SL I, c. 26; OPh I, 88: 113–116.The absolute terms, on the other hand, cannot be defined by the nominal definition unless it is taken in a loose way. “...proprie loquendo talia nomina [mere absoluta] non habent definitionem exprimentem quid nominis, quia proprie loquendo unius nominis habentis definitionem exprimentem quid nominis est una definitio explicans quid nominis, sic scilicet quod talis nominis non sunt diversae orationes exprimentes quid nominis habentes partes distinctas, quarum aliqua significat aliquid quod non eodem modo importatur per aliquam partem alterius orationis. Sed talia quantum ad quid nominis possunt aliquo modo pluribus orationibus non easdem res secundum suas partes significantibus explicari, et ideo nulla earum est proprie definitio exprimens quid nominis...de nominibus mere absolutis quod stricte loquendo nullum eorum habet
definitionem exprimentem quid nominis. Talia autem nomina sunt huiusmodi‘homo’, ‘animal’,‘capra’ , ’lapis’, ‘arbor’,‘igni s’ , ‘terra’, ‘aqua’,‘caelum’ ,‘albedo’ ,‘nigredo’ ,‘calor’,‘dulcedo’,‘odor’,‘sapor’ et huiusmodi.” SL I, c. 10; OPh I, 35–36: 14–23, 32–37. “...definitio exprimens quid nominis non est proprie nominum absolutorum sed connotativorum et relativorum.” Quodl. V, q. 19; OTh IX, 555: 52–53. See also SL III-3, c. 26; OPh I, 689–691: 2–49.
Adams 1987, 143. About Adams’s theory that Ockham had an “ontological program”, see ibid., 143–313.
Adams 1987, 277.
For this discussion, see Boler 1994–97. Graham White states as follows: “Neither is he [Ockham] straightforwardly an ontological reductionist...where he thought that entities were needed, he would postulate them.” White 1993, 299. Paul Vincent Spade says that Ockham’s ontology is “pretty sparse”. Spade 1990, 601. Later he remarks that it is “not as sparse as sometimes portrayed”. Spade 1999, 111. One of the themes of the extensive discussion of connotative terms pertains to the question of whether the connotation-theory serves for a program of ontological reduction. See the articles and monographs referred in footnote 32 on page 8, and in addition Klima 1999, and Panaccio 1999b, 58.
s0 SL I, c. 21; OPh I, 70–71: 31–42; ibid., c. 42; OPh I, 118: 11–14.
The question of whether respectus is the third most general genus remains a little unclear. Ord. I, d. 8, q. 2; OTh III, 187: 2–5. But: SL III-3, c. 18; OPh I, 666: 443–451. About this problem, see Adams 1987, 267–276; Henninger 1989, 140–145; Etzkorn 1990a, 560–562; Wood 1997, 29–30; Spade 1999, 104–105.
“...substantia multipliciter accipitur. Uno modo substantia dicitur quaecumque res distincta ab aliis, sicut frequenter talia inveniuntur in auctoribus‘substantia albedinis’,‘substantia coloris’, et sic de aliis. Aliter dicitur substantia magis stricte omnis res quae non est accidens realiter inhaerens alten. Et sic substantia dicitur tam de materia quam de forma quam etiam de composito ex utrisque. Aliter dicitur substantia strictissime de illo quod nec est accidens alteri inhaerens nec est pars alicuius essentialis, quamvis possit componere cum aliquo accidente. Et isto modo substantia ponitur genus generalissimum.” SL I, c. 42; OPh I, 118: 5–14. “...substantia cognoscitur in conceptibus connotativis et negativis, sicut in talibus: ens per se subsistens, ens non in alio, ens quod est subiectum omnium accidentium, et sic de aliis.” Ord. I, d. 3, q. 2; OTh II, 417: 4–7. In Summa logicae, Ockham admits that the substances have a number of other properties, too. See SL I, c. 43; OPh I, 122–132: 2–265. There cannot be a proper real definition of the absolute term‘substance’, since all the parts of the definition would be connotative or negative concepts. Besides, about the transcendental term ens Ockham says that it cannot be a genus since it is said about everything: “Alia regula est: quod dicitur de omnibus, non est genus; et propter hoc ens non est genus...” SL III-3, c. 18; OPh I, 670: 550–551. See Loux 1974, 19.
SL I, c. 10; OPh I, 36: 34–36; Quodl. VI, q. 16; OTh IX, 642: 68–71.
S4 “Videtur autem mihi quod secundum principia Aristotelis debet poni quod praedicamentum qualitatis est quidam conceptus vel signum continens sub se omnia illa per quae respondetur convenienter ad quaestionem factam per‘quale’ de substantia, quod non exprimit partem substantialem substantiae.” SL I, c. 55; OPh I, 180: 7–11.
“Sunt autem quaedam in genere qualitatis quae important res distinctas a substantia, ita quod illa res non est substantia, sicut sunt‘albedo’ et‘nigredo’,‘color’,‘scientia’,‘lux’ et huiusmodi. Quaedam autem sunt quae alias res a praedictis qualitatibus et substantia non important, cuiusmodi sunt‘figura’,‘curvitas’,‘rectitudo’,‘densitas’,‘raritas’ et huiusmodi.” SL I, c. 55; OPh I, 180: 14–19. How can one know whether it is a question of an absolute quality? Ockham thinks that if a predicable which cannot simultaneously be predicated truly of the same thing can successively be predicated of the same thing just by virtue of a local motion, it does not need to signify distinct things. SL I, c. 55; OPh I, 180–181: 20–35; Quodl. VII, q. 2; OTh IX, 708: 36–54. Such connotative terms as‘health’ (sanitas) and‘illness’ (aegritudo) refer to certain commensurations of qualities. See Exp. Phys. VII, c. 4; OPh V, 651–652: 8–9,10–13,15–18,24–25; Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 287–288: 44–52; Rep. III, q. 7; OTh VI, 204: 10–14.
See footnote 42 on page 11.
About the case of the Eucharist, see SL I, c. 44; OPh I, 135: 92–104; 138: 162–164; Quodl. IV, q. 32; OTh IX, 456: 23–24; ibid., q. 34; OTh IX, 466–467: 13–63; Tract. corp. Chr., c. 22; OTh X, 135–141: 5–167. See also Buescher 1950 (republ. 1974), 119–130. On the position that God can make a quality exist without a subject, Ockham is in line with the Paris Condemnation of 1277. See Grant 1996, 78–79. As Ruedi Imbach states, for Ockham the principal possibility that there are qualities that exist without subject opens up the possibility that the qualities of the souls, like volitions and intellections, can exist without the soul: “Diese Möglichkeit führt Ockham zu sehr folgenreichen Grenzbetrachtungen oder Gedankenexperimenten. Sofern man berücksichtigt, daß nach ihm die Akte des Willens oder des Intellekts als Qualitäten der Seele zu begreifen sind, ist man keineswegs überrascht festzustellen, daß Ockham die Hypothese von freischwebenden Willens- und Vernunftsakten erwägt. Es liegt auf der Hand, welche Denkmöglichkeiten durch diese Erwägung freigesetzt werden!” Imbach 1987, 50. Imbach refers to the following passage: “.. .non est maior contradictio quod accidens absolutum spirituale [intellectio et volitio] sit sine subiecto per potentiam Dei quam corporale...” Rep. IV, q. 9; OTh VII, 155: 15–17. (Imbach remarks: “Man denke in diesem Zusammenhang an die Überlegungen von Descartes, der erwägt, dass das sich im cogito entdeckende Subject nur eine res cogitans sein könnte.” Imbach 1987, footnote 47.)
Ockham gives this list of unions: “...unio naturae humanae ad divinam, unio materiae ad formam et e converso, unio accidentis ad subiectum, unio unius partis continui ad aliam.” Ord. I, d. 30, q. 4; OTh IV, 369: 3–6. About the ontological status of the relations, see footnote 51 on page 14.
SL I, c. 55; OPh I, 182: 69–83; Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 15; OPh II, 288: 4 — 292: 10. Taking‘similar’ and‘dissimilar’ broadly, the qualities are not the only principles of similarity or dissimilarity.
Generally, if there is no explicit reason not to do so, I take Ockham himself as agreeing with what he says that Aristotle says.
SL I, c. 55; OPh I, 181–182: 60–65; Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 271: 47–53.
“Hoc viso sciendum est quod Aristoteles ponit quatuor modos vel quatuor species qualitates.” SL I, c. 55; OPh I, 181: 36–37. “...est sciendum quod, sicut ponit Philosophus in Praedicamentis, quattuor sunt modi qualitatum: unus modus est habitus et dispositio; alius est naturalis potentia et impotentia; tertius est passio et passibilis qualitas; quartus est forma et circa aliquid constans figura.” Summ. phil. nat. III, c. 14; OPh VI, 293: 7–10. See also Exp. Phys. Arist. III, c. 2; OPh IV, 422: 28–31; Quaest. Phys. Arist., q. 8; OPh VI, 413: 21–24.
SL I, c. 55; OPh I, 181: 56–60; Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 282: 2 (§ 10) — 285: 2 (§ 10); Quodl. VII, q. 2; OTh IX, 707: 20–22.
“Sed dispositiones seu affectiones sunt de facili permutabiles...”Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 269: 9 (§ 3). See also Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 11; OPh II, 237: 9 (§ 8). Sometimes the term‘affect’ (affectus) seems to have the same meaning. See Ord. I, d. 30, q. 3; OTh IV, 337: 1; Tract. rel., c. un.; OPh VII, 349: 51.
“Primus modus est habitus et dispositio. Et vocatur habitus omnis qualitas de difficili mobilis, sive sit spiritualis sive corporalis. Dispositio autem vocatur omnis qualitas de facili mobilis, sive sit corporalis sive spiritualis. Et secundum hoc qualitas eiusdem speciei in uno est habitus et in alio est dispositio. Et est sciendum quod sub isto modo non tantum comprehenditur illud quod importat aliam rem a substantia sed etiam illud quod quandoque non importat aliam rem. Unde omne illud sub hoc modo continetur quod, faciliter vel difficiliter, propter mutationem rei removetur a subiecto. Et ut breviter dicam, omnis qualitas sub hoc modo continetur, et ideo dicitur‘species qualitatis’: non quia aliqua sit qualitas quae nec sit habitus nec dispositio, sed quia aliqua qualitas non est habitus et aliqua qualitas non est dispositio; vel dicitur‘species’, quia aliquid specialius connotat quam hoc nomen‘qualitas’.” SL I, c. 55; OPh I, 181: 37–50. See also Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 269: 2 (§ 3) — 274: 121; Elem. log. I, c. 18; OPh VII, 76: 5–6; Tract. praed., c. 4; OPh VII, 325: 14–18.
“ Philosophus non ponit hic in prima specie qualitatis praecise habitus et dispositiones vel qualitates ipsius animae, immo omnis qualitas quae est res una per se collocatur in ista prima specie qualitatis, quia omnis talis res vel est de facili mobilis vel de difficili. Et ita omnes qualitates sensibiles et omnis potentia naturalis vel impotentia quae est res per se una, continetur sub prima specie qualitatis, quia omnis talis qualitas vel est de facili mobilis vel de difficili mobilis. Unde de calore et frigore exemplificat. In ista specie sunt omnes actus et passiones animae, et universaliter omnis res per se una, alia a substantia, quia quaelibet talis vel est de facili mobilis vel de difficili mobilis, hoc est vel faciliter amissibilis vel difficiliter.” Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 272–273: 84–94.
“Aliud genus qualitatis ponitur potentia naturalis vel impotentia. Unde omnis res qua potest aliquid faciliter agere vel resistere actioni in hoc genere ponitur.” SL I, c. 55; OPh I, 181: 51–53. “...aliud genus qualitatis est secundum quod naturalis potentia aliquid faciliter faciendi vel patiendi, et similiter impotentia naturalis aliquid faciliter faciendi vel non patiendi dicitur qualitas.Et exemplificat dicens quod illud propter quod aliqui dicuntur
pugilatores naturaliter vel cursores vel salubres vel insalubres, dicitur qualitas. Nam iille qui faciliter potest pugilare habet aliquid quod non habet ille qui non potest sic faciliter pugilare, et illud vocatur potentia naturalis pugilandi, et est de secunda specie qualitatis. Et ita est de aliis...sicut durum et molle sunt in secunda specie qualitatis, ita calidum et frigidum sunt in eadem specie, et huiusmodi, quia possunt poni principia faciliter agendi seu operandi alicui, a quo sunt de difficili mobiles.“Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 274: 2–11, 276: 54–57. See also Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 274: 12 — 276: 53; Elem. log. I, c. 18; OPh VII, 76: 6–7; Tract. praed., c. 4; OPh VII, 325: 19–21.
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 276: 58–61.
“Tertia species ponitur passio et passibilis qualitas. Omnis enim qualitas sensibilis ponitur in tertia specie qualitatis.” SL I, c. 55; OPh I, 181: 54–55. See also Elem. log. I, c. 18; OPh VII, 76: 7–8; Tract. praed., c. 4; OPh VII, 325: 22–23.
“...omnis passio et passibilis qualitas ab aliquo sensu potest sentiri.” Rep. III, q. 3; OTh VI, 117: 18–19. See also Rep. III, q. 2; OTh VI, 60: 12–16.
Exp. Praed. Arist., c.14; OPh II, 276: 2 — 282: 26.
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 277–279: 7–20, 47–61.
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 279: 62–75.
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 279: 4–10.
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 281: 63–66.
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 279–280: 10–15.
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 280: 23–34. After saying this, Ockham remarks that in the “vulgar” language and sometimes even in Aristotle, something is called quale, e.g., white or black, only because of a permanent quality, that is, when it is white or black permanently. Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 280–281: 34–62.
“...in visu imprimitur quaedam qualitas confortans vel debilitans organum visus, et illa est subiective in organo, quia organum debilitatur et non potentia, sicut patet per Philosophum, I De anima, de oculo senis. Et est illa qualitas alterius rationis ab obiecto extrinseco, et illa nec est passio nec passibilis qualitas, sed est quaedam qualitas quae non est in aliqua specie qualitatis enumerata ab Aristotele, quia omnis passio et passibilis qualitas ab aliquo sensu potest sentiri. Sed ista a nullo potest sentiri, quia potest manere in organo etiam si potentia
nullum actum potest elicere, sicut patet in aliquo caeco. Et ideo illae species quas enumerat Aristoteles sunt insufficientes. Exemplum: venenum per aliquam qualitatem interficit hominem, et illa nec est passio nec passibilis qualitas, quia a nullo sensu potest sentiri.” Rep. III, q. 3; OTh VI, 117: 12 — 118: 5. “...illa virtus [causata a magnete], si ponatur, nec est passio nec passibilis qualitas, quia nullo sensu potest sentiri. Et per consequens, illae quattuor species qualitatis quas ponit Philosophus sunt insufficientes.” Rep. III, q. 4; OTh VI, 141: 1–4.
In Summula philosophiae naturalis III, c. 14 Ockham states that, in addition to the Aristotelian division of the classes of quality concerned, one can posit another division. He does not develop that division to a great extent, and it even remains unclear whether it is only meant to be a division of the third class of quality. The first element in that division is the sensible quality that can be sensed by a particular (exterior) sense. Such qualities are hotness, coldness, color, savor, and odor. The second element is the quality that is not sensible by any particular (exterior) sense. Such qualities are the sensations, interior imagination, appetitive act, intellection, and volition, and in addition to the things in the soul, some corporeal things: “Sed praeter istam divisionem qualitatis potest poni alia, quia quaedam est qualitas sensibilis quae ab aliquo sensu particulari potest sentiri, cuiusmodi est calor, frigus, color, sapor, odor et sic de aliis. Alia autem est qualitas quae non est sensibilis ab aliquo sensu particulari, cuiusmodi sunt ipsae sensationes, quia ipsa visio oculi non potest videri nec ab aliquo sensu sentiri. Similiter talis qualitas est imaginatio interior, et actus appetendi, et intellectio et volitio. Utrum autem in rebus inanimatis corporalibus sit aliqua qualitas quae non possit sentiri aliquo sensu particulari, patebit inferius.” Summ. phil. nat. III, c. 14; OPh VI, 293: 11–19. (The editor of Summula writes that by‘inferius’ the author referred to the third part of Summula he intended to write. Ibid., 293, footnote 2.)
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Hirvonen, V. (2004). Introduction. In: Passions in William Ockham’s Philosophical Psychology. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2119-0_1
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