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Reason and Rationality

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Book cover Handbook of Epistemology

Abstract

Over the past few decades, reasoning and rationality have been the focus of enormous interdisciplinary attention, attracting interest from philosophers, psychologists, economists, statisticians and anthropologists, among others. The widespread interest in the topic reflects the central status of reasoning in human affairs. But it also suggests that there are many different though related projects and tasks which need to be addressed if we are to attain a comprehensive understanding of reasoning.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. King’s College London, UK

    Richard Samuels

  2. Rutgers University, USA

    Stephen Stich & Luc Faucher

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  1. Richard Samuels
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  2. Stephen Stich
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  3. Luc Faucher
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

    Ilkka Niiniluoto

  2. University of Tampere, Finland

    Matti Sintonen

  3. Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland

    Jan Woleński

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Samuels, R., Stich, S., Faucher, L. (2004). Reason and Rationality. In: Niiniluoto, I., Sintonen, M., Woleński, J. (eds) Handbook of Epistemology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_4

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