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Epistemology and Cognitive Science

  • Frederick F. Schmitt

Abstract

I will define epistemology in the traditional way, as the conceptual and normative study of knowledge. Epistemology inquires into the definition, criteria, normative standards, and sources of knowledge and of kindred statuses like justified belief, evidence, confirmation, rational belief, perceiving, remembering, and intelligence. Cognitive science is, by contrast, the interdisciplinary empirical study of cognition in human beings, animals, and machines, and the attempt to engineer intelligent cognition.1 Cognitive science spans work in diverse fields, including empirical cognitive psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence (AI), neuroscience, and cognitive anthropology.2 Both epistemology and cognitive science study knowledge, but they have different aims, interests, and methods.

Keywords

Cognitive Science Subjective Probability Justify Belief Rational Belief Reflective Equilibrium 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frederick F. Schmitt
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUSA
  2. 2.Indiana UniversityUSA

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