Perception and Consciousness

  • Robert Audi


In very general terms, perception is a response to the world. The paradigm cases of it are responses by the five senses: we see, hear, touch, taste, taste, and smell. But we also have an awareness of states of our own body, such as the position and movement of our limbs, and that awareness is at once similar in character to perception yet not dependent on the five senses. There is a third kind of awareness, one that is distinct, at least conceptually, from our awareness of our bodily condition and movements; its object is our own mental states. The first — ordinary perception — has been called exteroception (“outer perception”), the second interoception (“inner perception”) or, in a special case, proprioception, though taking this term generically in the sense of ‘self-perception’ we might conveniently use it to designate the third case, in which the object of awareness is mental. All three are important for this study, particularly the first and third. Under the more general rubrics of perception and introspection (or self-consciousness), these are perennially basic topics in epistemology, construed as the theory of knowledge and justification.


True Belief Visual Experience Sensory Experience Justify Belief Perceptual Belief 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Alston, W.: 1963, `Back to the Theory of Appearing’, Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999), 181–203, Cf. R. M. Chisholm, in M. Black, (ed.), Philosophical Analysis, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.Google Scholar
  2. Alston, W.: 1991, Perceiving God, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.Google Scholar
  3. Armstrong, D. M.: 1961, Perception and the Physical World, Penguin Books, London.Google Scholar
  4. Armstrong, D. M.: 1968, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.Google Scholar
  5. Armstrong, D. M.: 1973, Belief Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Audi, R.: 1978, `The Ontological Status of Mental Images’, Inquiry 21, 348–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Audi, R.(ed.): 1993, The Structure of Justification, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.Google Scholar
  8. Audi, R.: 1993, `The Foundationalism Coherentism Controversy: Hardened Stereotypes and Overlapping Theories’, in Audi, The Structure of Justification.Google Scholar
  9. Audi, R.: 1994, `Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe,’ Nous 28, 419–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Audi, R.: 1997, Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, Oxford University Press, New York.Google Scholar
  11. Audi, R.: 1997, `Intuitionism, Pluralism and the Foundations of Ethics’, in Audi, Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.Google Scholar
  12. Audi, R.:1998, Epistemology, Routledge, London and New York.Google Scholar
  13. Barnes, W. H. F.: 1944–45, `The Myth of Sense Data’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45.Google Scholar
  14. Bonjour, L.: 1997, In Defence of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Chisholm, R. M.: 1948, `The Problem of Empirism’, Journal of Philosophy 45.Google Scholar
  16. Chisholm, R. M.: 1957, Perceiving, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.Google Scholar
  17. Dretske, F.: 1969, Seeing and Knowing, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.Google Scholar
  18. Dretske, F.: 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
  19. Firth, R.: 1978, `Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts?’, in A. Goldman and J. Kim (eds.): Values and Morals, pp. 215–29, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Gibson J.: 1950, The Perception of the Visual World, Houghton Mifflin, Boston.Google Scholar
  21. Grice, H. P.: 1961, `The Causal Theory of Perception’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 35.Google Scholar
  22. Hannay, A.: 1971, Mental Images: A Defence, George Allen and Unwin, London.Google Scholar
  23. Heil, J.: 1983, Perception and Cognition, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles.Google Scholar
  24. Heil, J and Mele A. (eds.): 1993, Mental Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York.Google Scholar
  25. Helmholtz, H., von: 1867, Treatise on Physiological Optics, transl. by J.P.C. Southall, Dover Publications 1962, New York.Google Scholar
  26. Hume, D.: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in E. Steinberg (ed.) 1977, Hackett, Indianapolis.Google Scholar
  27. Hume D. 1739–40: A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.) 1888, Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
  28. Lewis C. I.: 1946, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois.Google Scholar
  29. Locke, J.: 1689, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.Google Scholar
  30. McLaughlin, B.P. and A.O. Rorty: 1988, Perspectives on Self-Deception, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles.Google Scholar
  31. Marr, D.: 1980, `Representing and Computing Visual Information’, in H.C. Longuet-Higgins and N.S. Sutherland (eds.), The Psychology of Vision, London.Google Scholar
  32. Quine, W. V.: 1992, Pursuit of Truth, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
  33. Robinson, H.: 1994, Perception, Routledge, London and New York.Google Scholar
  34. Rock, I. (ed.): 1997, Indirect Perception, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
  35. Smart, J. J. C.: 1959, `Sensations and Brain Processes’, Philosophical Review 68, 141–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Wittgenstein, L.: 1953, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert Audi
    • 1
  1. 1.University of NebraskaLincolnUSA

Personalised recommendations