Abstract
‘Realism’ refers, not to a single, simple thesis, but to a whole family of positions; and so it contrasts, not with a single, simple, opposing thesis, but with another whole family of non-realist positions — idealism, nominalism, instrumentalism, relativism, irrealism, etc., etc.
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Haack, S. (2004). Realism. In: Niiniluoto, I., Sintonen, M., Woleński, J. (eds) Handbook of Epistemology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_10
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