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Abstract

‘Realism’ refers, not to a single, simple thesis, but to a whole family of positions; and so it contrasts, not with a single, simple, opposing thesis, but with another whole family of non-realist positions — idealism, nominalism, instrumentalism, relativism, irrealism, etc., etc.

Keywords

Natural Kind Scientific Realism Logical Positivist Background Belief Theoretical Entity 
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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Susan Haack
    • 1
  1. 1.University of MiamiUSA

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