Abstract
There is an ancient and ambiguous philosophical doctrine that perception is passive. This can mean that the mind contributes nothing to the content of our sensory experience: its power of perception is a mere receptivity. In this sense the principle has often been questioned, and is indeed doubtful on empirical grounds, given one reasonable interpretation of what it would be for the mind to make such a contribution.
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© 1970 The Royal Institute of Philosophy
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Ayers, M.R. (1970). Perception and Action. In: Knowledge and Necessity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-86205-4_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-86205-4_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-10558-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-86205-4
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