Abstract
In his book Attention, Professor Alan White says ‘When you see X, it follows that if X is Y, you see Y whether you realise it or not.’2 If, in passing through Paris, I saw a tall complex iron structure and that structure is the Eiffel Tower, then I saw the Eiffel Tower whether I realised it or not. I accept this, but because recent philosophical writings and discussions3 have cast doubt on the validity of the inference-pattern
I saw x; x is y; so I saw y
sand certain related patterns, it is clear that we cannot be content with this unvarnished statement. Various entertaining examples are produced to show that some instances of this pattern are invalid and therefore that the pattern itself is invalid. If I saw Jones at noon and at noon Jones was bribing Smith then, it is alleged, I cannot conclude that I saw Jones bribing Smith. Similarly, it is said, from the facts that I saw a man in the far distance and that that man was my father, I cannot conclude that I saw my father in the far distance; from the facts that I saw a foot and that that foot was Lloyd George’s I cannot conclude that I saw Lloyd George.
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Notes
Alan R. White, Attention (Oxford, 1964) p. 54.
Some examples, but not necessarily the view I am criticising, are to be found in: G. E. M. Anscombe, ‘The Intentionality of Sensation’, in Analytical Philosophy, ed. R.J. Butler, Second Series (Oxford, 1965);
R. M. Ghisholm, Perceiving (Ithaca, N.Y., 1947); F. Ebersole, ‘How Philosophers See Stars’, Mind (1965);
J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilo (Oxford, 1962) pp. 98 ff. Other examples have been suggested by P. Geach and, in conversation, by Paul Ziff.
J. F. Soltis in his book Seeing, Knowing and Believing (London, 1966) uses the notion of ‘simple seeing’ but describes it differently.
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© 1970 The Royal Institute of Philosophy
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Alexander, P. (1970). Inferences about Seeing. In: Knowledge and Necessity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-86205-4_4
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