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Moral Knowledge and Moral Principles

  • J. B. Schneewind
Part of the Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures book series

Abstract

What is the function of moral principles within the body of moral knowledge ? And what must be the nature of moral principles in order for them to carry out this function? A specific set of answers to these questions is widely accepted among moral philosophers — so widely accepted as almost to constitute a sort of orthodoxy. The answers embody a view of the place of principles within the body of morality which crosses the lines between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Though I have put the question in cognitivist terms and shall discuss it in those terms, I think a similar question and a more or less parallel discussion could be given in non-cognitivist terms. Perhaps the time-honoured debate between the two positions can be suspended, at least temporarily, while we examine, not the nature of morality, but its structure.

Keywords

Moral Judgement Moral Philosopher Moral Belief Moral Problem Moral Knowledge 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Note

  1. 1.
    D. H. Monro, Empiricism and Ethics (Cambridge, 1967) p. 8.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1970

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. B. Schneewind

There are no affiliations available

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