Abstract
As in the case of great books in all branches of philosophy, Pierre Duhem’s Le Théorie Physique, first published in 1906, can be looked to as the progenitor of many different and even conflicting currents in subsequent philosophy of science. On a superficial reading, it seems to be an expression of what later came to be called deductivist and instrumentalist analyses of scientific theory. Duhem’s very definition of physical theory, put forward early in the book, is the quintessence of instrumentalism:
A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws [p. 19].
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References
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© 1970 The Royal Institute of Philosophy
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Hesse, M. (1970). Duhem, Quine and a New Empiricism. In: Knowledge and Necessity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-86205-4_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-86205-4_11
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