Hypothesis in the Republic

Abstract

Plato believed in the possibility of absolute, incorrigible knowledge. Intelligence, he said in the Timaeus 51 D-E, is not the same as true opinion, for these two came into being separately and are unlike in nature. ‘The one comes to be in us through teaching, but the other owing to persuasion; and the one can always give a true account, but the other none ; and the one is immovable by persuasion, but the other can be persuaded away ; and it must be said that the one can be enjoyed by every man, but intelligence by gods, and by some small race of men.’ In the Theaetetus he argued elaborately and energetically that knowledge would not be true opinion even if that opinion could give an account of itself. In the Republic he was, though brief, most definite of all; he bluntly said that knowledge could not be the same as opinion because the latter is fallible but the former infallible (477E). He rated opinion at a very low value compared with knowledge.