Inside Europe: Domestic Pressures and the Redistribution of Power in Central Europe

Abstract

In any state, there is always a degree of interconnection between foreign and domestic policies. Sometimes, this is perfectly obvious, as in the case of the economic consequences of defence policies pursued in response to an overriding foreign threat. Sometimes it is commented upon, but is less obvious or quantifiable, as in the case of those German attitudes to British foreign policy — particularly in respect of her willingness to go to war — which were affected by the prolonged crisis in Ireland before 1914. In the event, there was no connection, but some outsiders — and a few insiders - thought that there might be. Naturally the detail and atmosphere of all states’ policies were affected by internal considerations. But only in the case of Germany and Austria was the fundamental stance of their policy heavily influenced by fears for the safety of their regimes. For them, either the possession of very great power, as in the case of Germany, or the absolute necessities dictated by an anachronistic state structure, as in the case of Austria, came to suggest the use of foreign policy as a weapon in domestic policy. Other states might have wished to do this: Russia perhaps after 1905, but she was prevented, or dared not, for lack of power. Italy also showed a similar tendency, but failed to make any serious impact, partly because of insufficient management, but principally because she operated only on a small scale.